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THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
THE MONITORING BOARD, 
AND TflE DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CAREt 
GEORGE w. DENT' JR.* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of corporate governance underwent a revolution in the 1970's. 
Theorists finally abandoned the myth that a public corporation1 is managed 
by its board of directors, and constructed a new model under which the 
corporation is managed by its executive officers, and the board, dominated 
by outside directors, monitors management's performance. 2 This new 
"monitoring model" has gained wide acceptance among commentators,3 
and several of its elements have been adopted by many public corporations.4 
E¥en those commentators who do not enthusiastically embrace the entire 
monitoring model tend to agree that monitoring management is a significant 
board function. 5 
t © 1981 by George W. Dent, Jr. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. B.A., 
Columbia College, 1969; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1973. 
1 This Article will discuss only public corporations. The role of the board of 
directors in closely-held corporations poses entirely different questions. For pur-
poses of this Article, "public corporation" means a corporation whose securities are 
regularly traded on an exchange or over the counter. 
2 See notes 33-58 and accompanying text infra. 
3 See sources cited in note 49 infra. Many commentators insist that even more 
radical changes, such as federal chartering of corporations-perhaps with public 
directors committed to nonshareholder constituencies-or federal minimum stan-
dards for state chartering will be necessary. See generally M. GREEN, R. NADER & 
J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CoRPORATION (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. 
NADER]; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 
31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1975); Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Direc-
tors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978). Differences of 
opinion about corporate governance often reflect radically different views of how 
corporations should function and to whom they should be accountable. Many 
advocates of more radical changes in corporate governance want to divert corpora-
tions from the pursuit of profit maximization to the pursuit of social goals. 
4 See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra. 
5 See note 49 and accompanying text infra. The only major criticism of the 
monitoring model has been by Solomon, supra note 3. Solomon examines three 
cases of boards restructured in the wake of corporate scandals. He finds the 
restructuring unsatisfactory because "[n]ew directors have been drawn from the 
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But expositions of the monitoring model to date have been rudimentary. 
Its proponents have not suggested what forces will prompt corporations to 
adopt the model and thereby move it from theory to widely accepted reality. 
Nor have they described in detail what the board's duties would be under 
the model, much less how these duties would be discharged. Until these 
problems are satisfactorily resolved, the potential of tlie monitoring model 
for improving corporate governance must be considered an open question. 
This Article grapples with these problems. In exploring the possible 
mechanisms for enforcing adoption of and performance under the monitor-
ing model, the Article concludes that market forces alone will not suffice and 
that legislative solutions face insuperable political and theoretical obstacles.6 
Accordingly, special attention is given to the duty of care of directors and 
officers as a possible enforcement mechanism. The duty of care has been a 
problem child of corporate law. Its command that directors and officers 
perform their duties with reasonable prudence appears on its face to provide 
a significant constraint on directors and officers, especially in an age when 
control has become divorced from ownership in public corporations.7 In 
practice, however, the duty of care has proved almost totally ineffectual. 8 A 
key question concerning the monitoring model, then, is what will be the 
content of the duty of care given the new role of the director that the model 
envisions and, more particularly, whether the duty of care can be revived 
and used as a tool for enforcing the monitoring model. 
It will be seen that justifications for the evisceration of the duty of care are 
unpersuasive; accordingly, the way is open to its revitalization. 9 However, 
analysis of the possible duties of directors under the monitoring model will 
show that in many respects it will be extremely difficult or impossible to 
fashion legal rules for the enforcement of these duties. 10 These conclusions 
same elite as old directors," id. at 596 (even though he concedes that appointment 
of "nonestablishment" directors creates overwhelming problems, id. at 601-02) and 
because "new boards have not been notably more aggressive than unreformed 
boards," id. at 596. He does not, however, explain how or why the directors should 
have been more aggressive. Nor does he explain why the directors were not aggres-
sive, except for his statement that they were drawn from "the same elite as old 
directors," a practice which he seems to concede is unavoidable. Nor does he 
consider possible approaches to make the restructured board more effective. Some 
commentators, though they do not criticize monitoring itself, have criticized the 
outsider dominated board, which is fundamental to monitoring. S. VANCE, BoARDS 
OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 5 (1964); Schmidt, Does Board 
Composition Really.Make a Difference?, 12 CoNF. BD. REc. 38 (Oct. 1975). 
6 See notes 66-123 and accompanying text infra. 
7 See text following note 223 infra. 
s See notes 131-64 and accompanying text infra. 
9 See notes 165-207 and accompanying text infra. 
10 See Section VI infra. 
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suggest that the new model's potential to improve corporate governance may 
be more limited than its proponents have hoped. 11 
II. THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A. The Failure of the Old Model 
The keystone of the traditional model of corporate governance was the 
provision once contained in state corporate laws that "[t]he business and 
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by the board of directors. " 12 In 
fact, boards of directors do not and have never managed public corpora-
tions. That task is performed by the executive officers, particularly the chief 
executive officer. 13 These corporate officers may also be members of the 
board, but their power to manage derives not from board membership but 
from corporate office. 14 Outside directors-directors who hold no office with 
the corporation-play little role in its management. 15 With few exceptions, 
the board quickly rubberstamps proposals drafted by the true management, 
the executive officers. As Myles Mace showed in his classic study, Direc-
tors: Myth and Reality, directors occasionally give advice and counsel at the 
request of the chief executive officer, provide some limited discipline over 
management, and replace the chief executive officer in times of crisis .16 The 
11 See text following note 302 infra. 
12 The Business Corporation Act of 1933, § 33, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33 
(Supp. 1974) (Smith-Hurd). See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-1 (West Supp. 1968); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 701 (McKinney 
Supp. 1974). These statutes and most others have now been modified to provide that 
the corporation shall be managed by or under the supervision of a board of directors. 
See note 31 and accompanying text infra. 
13 See J. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 12 (1945); H. KOONTZ, THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 21 (1967); M. MACE, DIREC-
TORS: MYTH AND REALITY 73, 76-77, 80 (1971). 
14 This is proved not only by the impotence of directors who hold no corporate 
office-the outside directors-but also by the manner in which corporate decisions 
are made. Advice is sought and disputes are resolved among the officers before the 
board meeting. Proposals are generally approved unanimously by the board after a 
little friendly discussion. Boards rarely reject decisions reached by the controlling 
corporate officers. See M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 43-71. 
15 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 21. This is not a new discovery. Over a 
century ago one committee concluded that "the very necessities of the case" made 
"practice ciphers" of the outside directors. REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING COM-
MITTEE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY 169 (Philadelphia 1874), 
quoted in A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 313 (1962). 
16 M. MACE, supra note 13, at 13. See also M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE CORPORATION 140-41 (1976). 
--------------------·· 
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board does not even plan the corporation's general strategy, as some have 
argued it could or should do . 17 
The directors' failure to manage springs not from personal negligence but 
from a basic structural defect in the traditional model of corporate gover-
nance; that is, the board could not manage the corporation even if it wanted 
to do so. First, the chief executive officer dominates the board. Despite the 
trend toward more outside directors, 18 boards traditionq.lly have been, and in 
many cases still are, composed largely of insiders 19-the chief executive 
officer and his subordinates. The subordinates cannot flout the chief's au-
thority when functioning as directors in his presence. 20 Outside directors, 
though less subject to the control of the chief executive officer, are still 
unlikely to be very independent. Many are either quasi-insiders whose 
autonomy is curbed by economic ties to the corporation and its head, 21 or else 
17 R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 128-29, 131 
(2d ed. 1961); M. MACE, supra note 13, at 43, 68. But see C. BROWN, PUTTING THE 
CoRPORATE BoARD TO WoRK 30 (1976) ("the board of directors is the proper body 
for the establishment of broad policies and procedures"). Nor do the outside 
directors select the chief executive officer, M. MACE, supra note 13, at 65, 70; have 
a significant approval role, R. GoRDON, supra at 128-29; or even ask significant 
questions, M. MACE, supra note 13, at 52-55, 69. 
18 CONFERENCE BOARD, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 84 (1977); HEIDRICK & 
STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 6 (1977); KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, 
BoARD OF DIRECTORS: FIFTH ANNUAL STUDY 3, 9 (1978); Small, The Evolving 
Role of the Director. in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1356 
(1979). 
19 See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD UPDATE 3 (1978) 
(ratio of outside directors remained virtually unchanged from 1971 to 1978); M. 
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 144-45; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 123 (arguing that 
recognition of a trend to more outside directors depends on a dubious definition of 
"outside director"). 
20 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 144-45; M. MACE, supra note 13, at 119-20; 
E. McSWEENEY, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 105 (1978); Solomon, supra note 3, 
at 584. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
926 (5th ed. unabridged 1980); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the 
Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1803-04 (1976). Although the chief 
executive may not have absolute power over the other officers, any differences in 
opinion among them are likely to be hammered out before the board meeting. 
Management then presents a united front at the meeting. See M. MACE, supra note 
13, at 120. 
21 Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11 (1972); Solomon, 
supra note 3, at 590. See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1830. Cf M. 
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 146 ("approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of the 
outside directors ... are lawyers or investment bankers [most of whom] are 
suppliers of services to the corporation"); KoRNIFERRY INTERNATIONAL, BoARD 
OF DIRECTORS ANNUAL STUDY: BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRIALS SUPPLEMENT 4 
(1979) (reporting that although the average nominating committee of the companies 
studied had one inside and four outside directors, two of the four outsiders were 
1981] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 627 
friends of the chief executive officer. 22 Moreover, most outside directors are 
corporate executives who expect outside directors to play a passive role on 
their own boards and who naturally play a passive role when they themselves 
are outside directors. 23 Directors who cause trouble may be fired. 24 
Outside directors lack not only the independence but also the intimate 
knowledge of the corporation, the time, and the information generated by an 
independent staff that would be necessary to manage. Most outside directors 
have their primary jobs with corporations in industries different from the 
corporations on whose boards they sit; indeed, the antitrust laws would 
generally prevent the use of outside directors from corporations in the same 
"affiliated" so that a majority of the average nominating committee consisted of 
insiders and quasi-insiders). Indeed, there is some dispute whether some directors 
typically classified as outsiders should be so classified. See H. KooNTZ, supra note 
13, at 122; M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 10 n.2. But see Lubin, Outsiders In: Firms 
Adding More Independent Directors But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches, 
Wall St. J., May 26, 1978, at 38, col. 1 (stating that recently fewer outside directors 
have been "quasi-insiders"). This has prompted a trend toward using different 
terms. The New York Stock Exchange's Audit Committee Policy, for example, 
uses the term "independent director," which it defines as a person "free from any 
relationship that ... would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment.'' 
NYSE GuiDE (CCH) ~ 2495H (1977). In 1978, the SEC proposed to characterize 
directors as affiliated and unaffiliated but later abandoned the proposal. See SEC 
Exchange Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,645; notes 93-95 and accompanying text infra. 
22 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 146; M. MACE, supra note 13, at 95, 97-100, 
108; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584-85; Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 327-28 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (statement of Roderick M. Hills) 
("outsiders ... are all too often old friends of the chief executive officers who 
would rather resign from the board than severely criticize or vote to oust their old 
friend"). See J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 28 & Table 4 (1973). 
See also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev' d on other 
grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). But cf. Senate Hearings, supra, at 140 (statement of 
Richard M. Cyart) ("[r]ecruitment [of new directors] is not a question of the 
president getting friends on the board"). 
23 E. McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584 n.13. 
See M. MACE, supra note 13, at 54, 69-70 (indicating that chief executive officers 
consider the role of outside director a minor, passive one). See also note 148 infra. 
24 M. MACE, supra note 13, at 80; E. McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106. See 
also HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INc., supra note 18, at 12 (over 36% of industrial 
corporations surveyed reported having "fired" directors). Some have referred to 
the "mushroom" concept of a good director: "Put him in a damp dark place, feed 
him plenty of horse manure, and when his head rises up through the pile to get 
attention or ask a question cut it off quickly and decisively." John T. O'Connor, An 
Alternative to the Goldberg Prescription, Rema;ks before the American Society of 
Corporate Secretaries 4 (March 14, 1973) quoted in C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 6. 
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industry. 25 Their contact with the corporation is usually limited to a meeting 
of a few hours' duration once a month or less frequently, 26 much too little 
time to learn to manage a public corporation. Information presented to the 
board is prepared under the chief executive officer's control and usually 
arrives too late to be digested by the outsiders •before they must act on it.27 
The minimal pay given most directors shows how insignificant their role is in 
corporate governance. 28 Thus, outside directors are neither disposed nor 
able to play an active role in managing the corporation. 
In light of the commentators' recognition that boards cannot manage, it is 
not surprising that courts have explicitly held on occasion that the directors 
are not liable for failing to do so. 29 More often, though, courts have main-
tained the fiction that the board must manage, but in various ways have 
whittled the duty down almost to nothing. 30 In either case, the board was 
left, so far as the courts were concerned, with no significant function. Some 
state corporation laws have been amended to reflect the realization that 
boards do not manage. The Model Business Corporation Act, for example, 
was revised to provide that "the business and affairs of a corporation will be 
managed under the direction of a board of directors,'' and many state 
25 Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976). 
26 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 141-43 ("few boards spend more than 
thirty-six hours a year in meeting time" and "time spent preparing for meeting is 
roughly comparable to meeting time"); KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 
18, at 20 (median time spent is a little over 70 hours per year, ''industry time on 
committees and expected homework"); M. MACE, supra note 13, at 107, 109, Mace, 
Designing a Plan for the Ideal Board, 54 HARV. Bus. REv. 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1976). 
27 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 143-44. See also M. MACE, supra note 13, at 
107 ("And to assume that company presidents [as outside directors]-busy com-
pany presidents-will spend the time to do the homework essential to understand-
ing company problems is asking more than should be reasonably expected."). 
28 H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 147 (directors "are among the lowest-paid 
segments of the American managerial hierarchy"); M. MACE, supra note 13, at 
101-04; Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 327-28 (statement of former SEC 
Chairman Roderick M. Hills) ("Compensation for directors of too many large 
corporations is set at a figure which makes it apparent that no real work is 
expected."). However, this may be changing. Heidrick & Struggles' survey shows 
that the median compensation for companies surveyed jumped from under $8,000 in 
1976 to over $12,000 in 1980. For larger corporations, compensation was consid-
erably higher. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD: 1980 UP-
DATE (1980). 
29 G~aham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85-86, 188 A.2d 125, 130 
(S. Ct. 1963); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted 
Reef?, An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware 
Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 924-25 & authorities cited at 925 n.23 (1980). 
Jo See notes 130-64 and accompanying text infra. 
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statutes followed suit.31 Although the amendments relieve the board of the 
duty to manage, they give no inkling of what the directors are supposed to 
do. 32 
B. The New Model: The Board as Monitor of Corporate Officers 
The old model of corporate governance having been discredited, commen-
tators began to fashion a new model that concedes to the executive officers 
the authority to manage but retains a useful role for the board. Professor 
Melvin Eisenberg, the leading advocate of the new model, reviewed propos-
als intended to enable the board to manage-including ones that called for 
fully-staffed boards and boards dominated by professional or full-time 
directors-and concluded that none was likely to succeed. 33 He argued that, 
rather than make an unrealistic demand that the board manage the corpora-
tion, we should try to ascertain what useful functions boards can perform 
and then conform the model of corporate governance to that reality. 34 
Examining those functions that the board can perform, he found none very 
important except the monitoring function. 35 He therefore proposed a new 
model of corporate governance that focuses on the board's monitoring func-
tion. 
31 MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 35 (1976). The Committee on Corporate Laws of the 
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Laws of the American Bar Associa-
tion approved the revision on September 21, 1974. Report a/Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501 
(1975). For a discussion of identical and comparable state statutes, see MoDEL Bus. 
AcT ANN.§ 35, Par. 1, ~~ 3.01-.02 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141 (1980 Supp.); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 701 (McKinney 1963); W. CARY & 
M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 140. 
32 See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1799; Vagts, Directors: Myth and 
Reality, 31 Bus. LAw. 1227, 1230 (1976). The comment to the amendment of§ 35 
states that directors need not "become involved in the detailed administration of the 
corporation's affairs" but "may delegate to appropriate officers of the corporation 
the authority to exercise those powers not required by Jaw to be exercised by the 
board itself." As to what directors are supposed to do, the comment says only that 
"the board has the power to probe to any depth but has a responsibility to do so only 
to the extent that the standard of care would require." Report of Committee on 
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 
501' 504-05 (1975). 
33 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 49-56. See also Eisenberg, Legal Models of 
Management Structure in the Modem Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Ac-
countants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975), one of a series of articles on which the 
book just cited is based. The proposals rejected by Professor Eisenberg call for 
professional directors, full-time directors, and fully-staffed boards. 
34 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 156. 
35 Id. at 156-68. The functions Professor Eisenberg deems unimportant are giving 
advice and counsel to the chief executive officer, authorizing major corporate 
functions, and providing a vehicle for exercising influence or control. 
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Discussion of the monitoring model is complicated by the absence of any 
detailed definition of what it is or how it would be effectuated. Professor 
Eisenberg and others have described the new model in a rudimentary fashion 
only.36 The purpose of this Article is not to define the model precisely but to 
inquire whether under any plausible definition the model would be enforce-
able. It is therefore appropriate simply to describe the areas of agreement 
and the undecided issues concerning the model's definition. All agree that 
monitoring entails selecting, evaluating, and, if necessary, removing and 
replacing directors and corporate executivesY Corollary functions include 
fixing management's compensation, reviewing transactions between the 
corporation and its insiders, and overseeing management's compliance with 
the law. It is an open question whether the board would select corporate 
accounting procedures.38 The commentators have not suggested the meth-
ods by which the board should discharge its duties-for example, how the 
board could evaluate management's performance or monitor management's 
compliance with law, or whether the board should have an independent staff 
to provide it with information. 
Another open question is whether the board should consider social as well 
as financial goals in evaluating management's performance.39 This Article 
will not attempt to resolve the old and continuing debate about for whom 
corporate managers are trustees-the shareholders or society at large.40 
More important than the author's agreement with those who would restrict 
the board to representing shareholder interests is the fact that adoption of 
36 See id. at 162-66. According to Professor Eisenberg, monitoring is intended 
"to determine whether the incumbent should remain in place." !d. at 164. Toward 
this end the board must set objectives "against which to measure management's 
results" and then "[go] behind the result" to determine whether it has been 
affected by unanticipated factors. !d. at 166. However, he does not suggest by what 
structures or procedures the board will do this, how the board will determine 
appropriate objectives, how disputes between the board and management should be 
resolved, or answers to many other questions critical to the monitoring model. 
Professor Mace does go into somewhat greater detail, but only by way of a list of 
board functions without substantial discussion of how these functions are to be 
discharged (e.g., by what standards executive compensation is to be set). Mace, 
supra note 26, at 21-22. Professors Leech and Mundheim discuss the proper func-
tions of the board in somewhat greater depth, but without suggesting concrete 
standards- for performance of these funtions. Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20. 
Most other advocates (see sources cited in note 49 infra) have been very vague. 
Mundheim, A Time to Learn, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND 
GoVERNANCE 179, 179-80 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) ("not many ... have gone 
beyond sketching the content of [monitoring] in a few specific situations."). 
37 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 162-68; Mace, supra note 26, at 21-22; 
Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 3, 27 (Summer 1977). 
38 See notes 270-78 and accompanying text infra. 
39 Professor Eisenberg believes the board should consider social goals. M. 
EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 165. 
40 See notes 295-97 and accompanying text infra. 
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the monitoring model itself will not lead to abandonment of a profit ori~nta­
tion. 41 Accordingly, this Article will analyze monitoring from the perspec-
tive of a traditional profit orientation. 
A key question is to what extent, if any, the board would retain authority 
to set or to review long range goals and major projects. Professor Eisenberg 
believes that the board is incompetent to decide these matters. Moreover, 
assigning these duties to the officers would facilitate development of an 
effective duty of care. 42 However, whether the courts will permit boards to 
abdicate completely their traditional authority over major corporate policy is 
questionable. 43 The revision of the Model Act and of many state statutes to 
relieve the board of the express duty to manage the corporation's business 
does not seem to have been intended to deny the board's authority over long 
range goals and major projects. 44 
If the board does retain some power over long range goals and major 
projects, the difference between the monitoring model and the traditional 
model of corporate governance is arguably a difference of emphasis only. 
Even if this is true, however, the difference of emphasis is significant. The 
traditional model has tended to view the corporate officers as mere 
functionaries effectuating the orders of the board. 45 Accordingly, any duty 
41 See notes 298-99 and accompanying text infra. 
42 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 140-41. Accord, Conard, A Behavioral 
Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DuKE L.J. 895, 917; Solomon, 
supra note 3, at 588. But see Goldsshmid, The Governance of the Public Corpora-
tion: Internal Relationships, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE STUCTURE AND 
GovERNANCE 167, 174 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979). 
43 Although the board may delegate many functions, it may not delegate all of its 
power, or so much of it as to be inconsistent with its duty to provide general 
Supervision of the corporation. 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 496 (rev. perm. ed. 1975). 
44 The Corporate Director's Guidebook says that the purpose of the revision was 
to "emphasize" the duty, inter alia, to "review and confirm basic corporate 
objectives.'' Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & 
Business Law, American Bar Ass'n, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. 
LAw. 1595, 1607 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Director's Guidebook]. The 
comment to section 35 states that the 1974 amendment was intended "to eliminate 
any ambiguity as to the director's role in formulating management policy as op-
posed to direct involvement in day-to-day management.'' Report of Committee on 
Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 
501, 505 (1975). However, the comment does not indicate precisely what the 
board's role is in management policy. See note 32 supra. 
45 
"Traditionally, officers are selected, and are removable, by the board of 
directors, which delegates to them authority to execute and administer the policies 
determined by the board of directors." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
CoRPORATIONS § 219, at 432 (2d ed. 1970) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, officers 
have only such powers as are conferred on them by the board or corporate charter. 
2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 434, at 301-03. Thus officers who are not directors 
are not deemed trustees, as are directors, but mere agents. 3 id. § 846. See generally 
id. § 1032. 
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to manage carefully rested with the board. Similarly, the board's duty to 
monitor the corporate officers was accorded little importance on the theory 
that the officers were mere functionaries. The monitoring model reverses 
this approach by placing the duty to manage primarily, if not exclusively, 
with the corporate officers and by elevating to major significance the board's 
duty to monitor. 
Although the utility of outside directors has hitherto been limited,46 the 
monitoring model may change this. The outside directors are not asked to 
manage, a task for which they are ill-suited, but only to monitor manage-
ment, a task for which an outsider's perspective is well-suited, perhaps even 
necessary. Inside directors cannot be expected to evaluate their own per-
formance dispassionately. Moreover, once it is candidly recognized that the 
board does riot itself manage but rather monitors management, arguments 
for a board dominated by outsiders become much more persuasive. 47 Once 
outsiders dominate the board and control nominating procedures, they will 
be in a much better position to act independently of management. 48 
Many commentators have accepted Professor Eisenberg's views or ones 
similar to them. 49 More important, many corporations are stressing the 
46 See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra. 
47 One argument against the outsider-dominated board has been that outsiders 
are less competent than insiders to manage the corporation. See Bialkin, Exaggerat-
ing the Moral Decline in Governance of Corporations, NAT. L.J., Dec. 25, 1978, at 
26, col. 1. This argument is valid, however, only if the board is indeed supposed to 
manage. But see note 254 and accompanying text infra. 
48 See notes 251-52 and accompanying text infra. 
49 C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 10, 109; Conard, supra note 42, at 917 (outside 
directors' function is ''to decide whether the inside directors are doing a reasonably 
good job"); DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OuTSIDE DIRECTORS (A. Cohen & 
R. Loeb eds. 1978) (statement of Ralph C. Ferrara); Friendly, Make Haste Slowly, 
in CoMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 525, 527-31 (D. 
Schwartz ed. 1979); Goldschmid, The Governance of the Public Corporation: Inter-
nal Relationships, in id., at 167, 174; Mace, supra note 26, at 21; Manning, supra 
note 37; Mundheim, A Time to Learn, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE STRUC-
TURE AND GovERNANCE 179 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Werner, Management, Stock 
Market and Corporate Reform: Berte and Means Reconsidered, 77 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 388, 412 (1977). The SEC has in speeches, enforcement actions, and 
explanatory releases encouraged changes in corporate governance generally consis-
tent with the monitoring model. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 581 n.4, 582 n.6, 
586-87; Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of Directors, 41 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 63, 76-78 (Summer 1977). 
Some commentators seek more radical changes in corporate governance, changes 
that would direct much of the energies of the corporation away from profit maximiza-
tion toward social goals. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 610. But the monitoring 
model is not inconsistent with these more radical views. Under the model, the 
officers attempt to achieve the corporation's goals, whatever they may be, and the 
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director's monitoring function, as evidenced by the growing number of both 
outside directors50 and oversight committees. The oversight committees are 
established expressly to perform various monitoring functions. 51 The most 
common are audit committees, which review the independent accountant's 
reports on auditing and accounting matters ;52 nominating committees, which 
review the performance of incumbent directors, suggest the removal of 
unsatisfactory directors, and recommend replacements for vacancies;53 and 
compensation committees, which review compensation of executive officers 
and may evaluate management's performance as part of this review.54 Most 
of these committees are composed primarily or exclusively of outside direc-
tors.55 Acceptance of monitoring by commentators and corporations has led 
the Corporate Director's Guidebook and some other authorities to speak of a 
duty of monitoring as if it were established fact rather than a remote ideal. 56 
Advocates of the monitoring model hope that it will provide some mean-
ingful check on self-serving behavior, incompetence, or complacency on the 
part of management, a check not always provided by shareholders or market 
forces. The result would be more honest and effective management-and 
perhaps greater faith in, and thus more legitimacy for, corporate man-
board evaluates management's performance, a task that necessarily entails setting 
the corporation's goals. 
50 In 1977, 83% of manfacturing companies and 86% of nonmanufacturing 
companies were reported to have a majority of outside directors. J. BACON & J. 
BROWN, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN NINE 
COUNTRIES (1977). See also sources cited in note 18 supra. 
51 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 216-17, and authorities cited 
therein. See generally A.B.A. Comm. on Corp. Laws, The Overview Committees of 
the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979). As to the growth of compensa-
tion, nominating, and audit committees, see notes 219, 252, & 265 infra. 
52 Under pressure from the SEC, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977), the New York Stock Exchange adopted a rule requiring each 
listed company to have an audit committee composed entirely of directors indepen-
dent of management. NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2495H (1977). An independent direc-
tor is defined as one "free from any relationship that ... would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment." !d. See generally notes 265-78 and accompany-
ing text infra for a discussion of the audit committee. 
53 See note 252 infra. See also notes 251-63 and accompanying text infra for a 
general discussion of nominating committees. 
54 See note 219 infra. See also notes 217-50 and accompanying text infra for a 
general discussion of compensation committees. 
55 A recent survey by the SEC shows that the vast majority of overview commit-
tees of the companies surveyed had a majority of outsiders and that in many cases 
these committees were composed exclusively of outsiders. SEC Exchange Act 
Release No. 17,518, SEC Docket 1551, Tables 14-18, at 1571-77 (Feb. 5, 1981). 
56 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 557-62; Corporate Director's 
Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1607-10. 
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agements.57 Others have questioned whether the model can improve corpo-
rate governance at all.58 
III. PROSPECTS FOR ADOPTION OF THE MONITORING MODEL 
VOLUNTARILY OR AS A RESULT OF MARKET FORCES 
Despite auspicious trends, the monitoring model is far from universally 
accepted. Most boards remain dominated by insiders or quasi-insiders,s9 
and most lack mechanisms to perform certain crucial monitoring functions. 6o 
Moreover, monitoring has received little judicial recognition. Unless the law 
imposes a duty to monitor, bureaucratic inertia and the human distaste for 
being judged will make many managements reluctant to adopt vigorous 
monitoring boards. 
Outside directors alone cannot be expected to impose a monitoring board 
on a corporation. They may justifiably fear that voluntary acceptance of a 
duty to monitor will increase their exposure to personal liability, especially 
since the traditional posture of director passivity has avoided liability so 
well. 61 Active monitoring will require more time from outside directors than 
the traditional model requires.62 Outsiders will not assume additional chores 
without additional compensation. Without some strong, external incentive 
they may decline to vote themselves adequate raises because the resultant 
fees would seem excessive in comparison with fees at corporations where 
directors were not required to monitor. Even with increased fees, many 
outside directors, being wealthy and busy executives, will hesitate to devote 
more time to a position they consider honorary. 63 Moreover, if they agree to 
monitor management aggressively they will be hard put to oppose board 
monitoring of their own performance in the corporations they manage. Even 
if outside directors were disposed to monitor, they are outnumbered by 
inside and affiliated directors in many corporations and thus will be unable to 
impose their will on the corporation. 64 
Management will not voluntarily adopt monitoring. Monitoring by the 
57 See Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1804. Most commentators have 
discussed monitoring in terms of dealing with existing problems rather than in terms 
of improving management or enhancing corporate legitimacy, see authorities cited 
in note 49 supra, but the two approaches are only different sides of the same coin. 
58 De Mott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil: Management and Structure and the 
Control of Corporate Information, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 182, 220-21 (Sum-
mer 1977); Solomon, supra note 3, at 588-89, 610. See note 3 supra. 
59 See note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
60 See, e.g., notes 219-21 and accompanying text infra. 
61 See note 130 and accompanying text infra. 
6 Z See H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 151, 232; Goldschmid, supra note 42, at 175; 
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1829. 
63 A principal reason for serving as an outside director is the prestige and honor of 
the position. M. MACE, supra note 13, at 105-09. Concerning the fee levels of 
directors, see note 28 supra. 
64 See note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
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board threatens not only criticism of management, perhaps disclosed to the 
public, 65 but also the discharge of managers found incompetent. Even 
confident managers may prefer not to submit to independent boqrd evalua-
tion unless managers of other corporations do likewise. Since few will want 
to be in the vanguard, monitoring will not be widely embraced unless 
required by some external forces. Even good faith efforts to install a moni-
toring system will be more successful if there is a legal duty imposed on 
directors to monitor. Finally, the initial burst of enthusiasm for monitoring 
cannot be expected to last forever. As the novelty of the new model wears 
off, commentators, the bar, and the SEC will tum their attention elsewhere; 
boards will feel less public pressure to monitor and will be less inclined to 
adopt the new model unless compelled by law to do so. 
But it may be argued that enforcement of the monitoring model is unnec-
essary and even counterproductive because market forces alone will push 
corporations to the optimal type and the amount of monitoring. Market 
forces are believed to motivate corporate managers to perform well: their 
performance affects the market price for the firm's securities, thereby affect-
ing not only their current income (through bonuses, stock options, and the 
value of stock already held), but also their job security (by changing the 
likelihood of a takeover of the firm by outsiders)66 and the market for their 
services with other corporations. 67 It could be argued that market forces will 
similarly affect the composition and functioning of the board. If monitoring 
maximizes corporate profits, corporations failing to adopt the model will see 
the market price of their stock fall and will be threatened by takeovers in 
which all directors will be replaced. In addition to takeover threats, both 
outside directors and insiders would have positive incentives to adopt moni-
toring. If board evaluation of management's performance became significant 
to investors, management might insist on such evaluation as a means of 
boosting both the firm's stock price and the market for the managers' 
services.68 If monitoring became widely accepted, a market would develop 
65 See note 228 infra. 
66 Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 784-86 (1978); Fama,Agency Problems and the The01y of 
the Firm, 77 J. PoL. EcoN. 288passim (1980); Lorie, An Economist's Perception I: A 
View on the Need to Revise C01poration Statutes, in CoMMENTARIES ON CoRPORATE 
STRUCTURE AND GoVERNANCE 51,56-59 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Werner, supra note 
49, at 404-05 and authorities cited in 404 n.105. 
67 See Fama, supra note 66, at 292-93; Werner, supra note 49, at 404. "(I]n some 
corporations the excruciating pressure to meet profit goals is so severe that some 
managers have committed illegal acts to induce sales, and falsified corporate books to 
conceal improper accounting entries designed to improve earnings or put a better 
face on corporate performance." Speech by SEC Chairman Harold Williams, Ade-
quate Information: Prerequisite to an Effective Board 16-17 (Sept. 16, 1980) (pre-
sented to the Financial Executives Research Foundation/American Society of Cor-
porate Secretaries, Philadelphia, Pa.). 
68 See Fama, supra note 66, at 292-93. Cf. Burton, Management Auditing, in 
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for the services of effective outside directors, and outside directors would 
want to monitor effectively so as to increase the value of their services in the 
market. 69 If, on the other hand, the monitoring model is not the most 
effective way of improving management's performance, market forces will 
discover the most efficient way and punish corporations that adopt monitor-
ing instead. 70 If this were the case, legal rules requiring monitoring could be 
counterproductive. 
The argument for reliance on market forces alone has several flaws. First, 
even if market forces do ultimately punish corporations that fail to adopt 
monitoring, that punishment, when it occurs, may be visited not on the 
managers but on the shareholders. Even an inevitable but distant takeover 
may not deter managers from lining their own pockets or keeping themselves 
in power too long because the day of reckoning is remote and the benefits in 
the interim are so great. 71 The shareholders will suffer, however, from 
lowered dividends and a lower price for their stock when the takeover does 
come.72 
Furthermore, market forces operating through the outside directors are 
not likely to be sufficient. First, in many corporations, genuinely indepen-
dent directors are too few to be able to impose their will.73 Second, a market 
for outside directors is unlikely to influence those outside directors who are 
highly paid executives of other corporations and who would not want 
careers as professional directors, even at fees considerably higher than the 
current mode. A sense of responsibility and concern for personal reputation 
will motivate outside directors to monitor in many cases, but where they do 
not, market forces will not oblige them to do so. Moreover, if the outsiders 
control the board, they may be able, subject only to a takeover threat,74 to 
ignore the market for their services as outside directors and vote themselves 
lavish fees without providing efficient monitoring. 
MODERN MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND IDEAS 483, 492 (D. Hampton ed. 1969) (credi-
tors, investors, and managers might insist on release of management audits). 
69 See Fama, supra note 66, at 294; Lear, Compensation for Outside Directors, 57 
Harv. L. REV. 18, 28 (1979) (increasing competition for outside directors has caused 
and will continue to cause higher directors' fees). 
70 See Fama, supra note 66. 
71 See id. at 296; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 273 (1977). 
72 In computing the amount per share the tender offeror is willing to pay share-
holders of the target,-it must subtract from the total amount the immense transaction 
costs of making the bid. It also must reduce the price to account for the risk that his 
offer may fail. Most important, the offeror will bid no more than necessary to obtain 
control. Since the price of shares in a mismanaged company will almost always be 
relatively low, the offeror may be able'to gain control at a price well below what the 
shares would command if the company were well managed, especially if no compet-
ing bidders appear. Indeed, some believe that offerors do not attempt takeovers 
except at bargain prices. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. 
LAW. 101, 106-09 (1979). 
73 See note 19 supra. 
74 Just as the threat of a takeover is insufficient to ensure energetic, competent, 
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Most important, the market for corporate control is not so efficient that a 
takeover will immediately (or perhaps ever) punish even the slightest devia-
tion from maximum efficiency. Even in an ideal takeover situation-minimal 
government regulation, a target company with stock widely scattered among 
many shareholders, and little stock held by management-the takeover of a 
large public company involves substantial transaction costs and risks of 
failure. 75 Moreover, the ideal is rare. Some corporations are so huge that any 
attempt to take them over is unthinkable. Others, their managements wary 
of takeovers, have a variety of shark-repellents to deter tender offers. 76 
Indeed, a servile board is an important element in any anti-takeover strategy. 
A servile board will approve any action by management, however outra-
geous, to keep itself entrenched. 77 The independent board envisioned by the 
monitoring model might take a neutral or even a favorable stance toward a 
takeover. 78 State and federal regulation of tender offers has also made them 
more difficult. At a minimum, disclosure requirements, such as those im-
posed by the SEC under the Federal Williams Act, make tender offers very 
expensive. 79 Many states' tender offer laws were adopted with the thinly 
and efficient management, see note 71 supra and 75 infra, that threat will also be 
insufficient to ensure energetic and competent outside directors. 
75 See 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CoNTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 99-100 
(1970); Winter, supra note 71, at 267-70. 
76 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 263-89 (1978) 
and Supp, 1980 at 134-41, detailing the many measures taken by corporate man-
agements to discourage takeovers. See also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 
20, at 1594-95. 
77 See Wyser-Pratte, Takeover Panel Needed To Protect Shareholders, N.Y.L.J., 
June 4, 1979, at 25, col. 5 (describing incidents in which the author believes that 
corporate managements have opposed tender offers that were clearly attractive to 
shareholders). See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 76, at vii: 
Modern corporate takeover battles resemble closely the feudal wars of the 
middle ages .... The Board of Directors is the Council. Like the feudal Council, 
it is often subservient to the Count [the president] .... Without the full support 
of the Council, takeover defense is almost impossible, and the Castle will be 
quickly lost. 
78 Even advocates of broad board discretion to oppose tender offers concede that 
shareholders will usually accept any tender offer at a substantial premium over the 
pre-offer price of the target company's shares. Lipton, supra note 72, at 113-14. A 
board more attuned to the wishes of the shareholders rather than management 
therefore might well be more receptive, or at least less hostile, to takeover bids. At the 
least, nonaffiliated outside directors do not face the same conflicts of interest as do 
inside and affiliated directors when weighing an unsolicited tender offer. See Wil-
liams, Tender Offers and the Corporate Director, (speech before the 7th Annual 
Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California, Jan. 17, 1980), reprinted in 
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,445 (1980). Thus, 
strengthening the independent directors would enhance the possibility of fair treat-
ment of shareholders. 
79 Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See 
Winter, supra note 71, at 268-69. See also Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of 
Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 371 (1980) 
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veiled purpose of preventing all hostile takeovers. 80 Takeover by proxy fight 
is also expensive and the advantages of incumbency are so great that proxy 
fights are rarely attempted except in extreme cases. 81 Thus, market forces 
cannot be relied upon as the sole tool for encouraging the adoption of 
efficient monitoring. 
Even if market forces induced most corporations to adopt monitoring, 
those corporations which are not subject to market forces would not be apt 
to adopt monitoring. Accordingly, some other mechanism will be necessary 
to require adoption of the monitoring model if it is to be fully accepted and 
reach its full potential. 
IV. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR REQUIRING ADOPTION OF THE 
MoNITORING MoDEL 
Three mechanisms for promoting the monitoring model deserve explora-
tion: use of existing federal legislation, enactment of new state or federal 
legislation, and use of the duty of care, sometimes common law and some-
times statutory, that directors and officers owe to the corporation they 
serve. 
A. Existing Federal Legislation 
No existing federal legislation is adequate to enforce the monitoring 
model. Prior to 1977, the "new fraud" doctrine developed under the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's rule 10b-582 appeared to be a federal basis 
for attacking mismanagement of public corporations. Even at its apex, 
however, the doctrine was flawed for this purpose because it was limited to 
fraud' 'in connection _with the purchase or sale of [a] security' ' 83 and because 
it covered only breaches of the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care. For 
example, although mismanagement in the purchase of property with stock 
would have been actionable, mismanagement in the purchase of property for 
cash could not have been attacked under the new fraud doctrine.84 In any 
event, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1977 case of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 
(concluding that state and federal regulations, although they increased the pre-
miums paid by btdders, have discouraged many takeover attempts, and that their 
effect on shareholders is generally detrimental). 
80 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 1603; Sommer, The Ohio 
Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 681, 682 (1970). 
81 Williams, Cumulative Voting, 33 HARV. Bus. REv. 108 (May-June 1955). 
8z 17 C.P.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). 
83 Id. Although this language of the rule was often expansively construed, see 
Superintendent oflns. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); R. JENNINGS & 
H. MARSH, CASES & MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 994-97 (4th ed. 1977), 
"many corporate mismanagement charges do not ... involve any purchase or sale of 
securities." /d., at 994. 
84 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); D. RATNER, 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 140-41 (1978). 
1981] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 639 
v. Green 85 that a 10b-5 suit requires an allegation of deception or manipula-
tion. 86 Although the lower federal courts have disagreed on the precise 
meaning of this holding, 87 it does establish that mismanagement alone is not 
actionable under rule lOb-5. Thus, rule lOb-5 certainly cannot be used to 
obligate a corporation to adopt a monitoring model for its board of directors. 
The SEC proxy rules adopted pursuant to section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act88 have been touted as a possible tool for encouraging monitor-
ing by directors. It is contended that shareholders' influence over board 
conduct will be enhanced if they are provided more information about the 
directors' activities. 89 Consequently, directors who do not actively monitor 
can be removed and replaced by those who will. But it is well established that 
most shareholders do not want to participate actively in corporate controJ.9° 
Moreover, even if they did, the lack of any alternative to management's slate 
of board nominees (except in the rare case of a proxy fight) renders their 
vote meaningless. Indeed, many commentators have concluded that even 
the existing· level of corporate proxy disclosure cannot be justified on a 
cost-benefit basis. 91 If increased disclosure of board practices will in fact 
affect those practices, the cause is likely to be potential embarrassment at 
the disclosures, not shareholder votes. However, many have questioned the 
propriety of using disclosure requirements in this way. 92 
A few years ago the SEC threatened to take disclosure of board practices 
to new lengths by establishing guidelines for director functions and requiring 
corporations to disclose the extent to which their board practices departed 
from these guidelines.93 The Commission eventually abandoned the effort 
8S 430 u.s. 462 (1977). 
86 ld. at 473-74. 
87 See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell ex 
rei. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 
209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). 
88 SEC rules 14a-1 to 12, 17 C.P.R. § 240.14ac1 to 12 (1980). 
89 Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 49. But see New Approaches to Disclosure in 
Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 530-31 (ABA Panel Discussion) 
(remarks of Harold Marse, Jr.) (it is unrealistic to expect management to evaluate 
itself candidly). 
9° C. BROWN, supra note.17, at 25; Manning, supra note 37, at 14-19. 
91 E.g., Benston,An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required 
Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. FRoB. 30 (Summer 
1977); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132 (1973). See also Stigler, 
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964) (concerning 1933 
Act disclosure). The criticisms apply equally to proxy disclosures. 
92 E.g., H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN 
SEARCH OF A PuRPOSE 190-91 (1979).- Others have defended the practice. See RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC 414 
(Nov. 3, 1977); Weiss & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 60. 
93 SEC Excha~ge Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,645 at 80,580. See Address by SEC Chairman G. 
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because of the difficulty of drafting the guidelines and complaints that the 
prqposals exceeded the SEC's authority. 94 Perhaps this semi-coercive dis-
closure approach could have effectively compelled corporations to follow 
the monitoring model. The rules actually adopted by the Commission are 
limited, however, to added disclosures about the directors' activities, 95 and it 
seems unlikely that this will shame many corporations into altering their 
board practices significantly. Shareholders' voting certainly will not be so 
altered by the new disclosures as to require corporations to amend their 
practices. 
More recently, the SEC has demanded revision of a corporation's gover-
nance structure as part of consent decrees in enforcement actions where it 
believes that a restructured board might help prevent future securities law 
violations. 96 The revisions demanded contain many elements of monitoring, 
including the establishment of a board with a majority of outside directors, of 
an audit committee, and of formal mechanisms to monitor management's. 
compliance with law. 97 Demands by the Commission for such ancillary relief 
raise a number ofproblems,98 but for present purposes it suffices to note that 
ancillary relief is of limited duration and can be obtained only in cases in 
which the SEC alleges that a corporation has violated the federal securities 
laws. 99 Even if ancillary relief is beneficial, it cannot be a tool for the general 
reform of corporate governance. 
Bradford Cook, Southern Methodist University School of Business Administration 
(April 6, 1973), reprinted in [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
79,302. 
·
94 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,766. See What the SEC Expects of Corporate 
Directors, address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. before Arthur D. Little Corpo-
rate Directors Conference, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 17, 1974). 
95 Item 6 to schedule 14A, 17 C.P.R. § 240.14a-IOI, as amended by Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 15,384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) 11 81,766. 
96 E.g., SEC v. Matte!, Iric., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6467, 6531, & 6532 
(D.D.C. 1974). See Farrand, Ancillwy Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions, 
89 HARV. L. REv. 1779 (1976); Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Avail-
able to the SEC for Breaches of Rule JOb-5, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 397 (1979); Note, 
Ancillary Relief in SEC injunction Suits for Violation of Rule JOb-5, 79 HARV. L. 
REV: 656 (1966); Comment, Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal 
Securities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737 (1976). 
97 Second Amended Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction and Ancillary 
Relief, SEC v. Matte!, Inc., Civ. No. 7H-2958-W (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 1974), 
reprinted in DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 167 (A. Cohen & 
R. Loeb eds. 1977). See Jacobs, supra note 96, at 442-45; Comment, supra note 96, at 
738-40. 
9B See generally Comment, supra note 96. 
99 In general, the SEC may seek judicial relief only for violations of the securities 
laws and rules. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (Supp. IV 1980); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (Supp. IV 1980). 
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Many other weapons in the SEC arsenal might be used to influence 
corporate governance-the internal accounting provisions of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 100 the power to impose rules on stock exchanges and 
the NASD, ~ 01 the power to discipline professionals, 102 and the power to 
publish findings after investigations. 103 However, these powers, even taken 
together and even if one accepts the SEC's broad construction of its pow-
ers, are inadequate to change corporate governance in any comprehensive 
way. More important, Congress did not intend to confer on the SEC any 
general powers regarding corporate governance but to leave that power 
where it had always been-with the states. 104 
B. New State or Federal Legislation 
Since existing federal legislation is inadequate to require directors to 
monitor, perhaps an enforcement tool should be sought in new federal or 
state legislation. A legislative solution has much to recommend it. Legisla-
tion could deal comprehensively with the corporate governance problem, 
prescribing the structure and duties of the board and its committees, the 
sanctions for failing to comply with the statute, and the means for enforcing 
the statute. More general virtues also inhere in legislation, such as its tex-
tual firmness and the legislature's capacity to investigate a problem 
thoroughly .1 05 Moreover, a federal legislative solution would prescribe uni-
form national standards. 106 This would be desirable because most large 
100 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. IV 1980). 
101 Id., § 19(b) & (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. iv 1980). The Commission used this 
power in effect to force the New York Stock Exchange to adopt its rule requiring 
each listed company to have an audit committee. See note 52 supra; Coffee, Beyond 
the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an 
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1274 (1977). 
102 SEC rule 2(e), 17 C.P.R.§ 201.2(e) (1980). The SEC's use of rule 2(e) has been 
seriously criticized. H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 198-205. 
103 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. ~ 78u (Supp. IV 1980). 
Former Commissioner Roberta Karmel has dissented from the use of section 21(a) as 
punishment absent a charge of violation of law. Spartek, Inc., SEC Exchange Act 
Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 81,961, at 81,408-11. 
104 H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 173-74 & 174 n.2. Even Professor Cary, a leading 
advocate of greater federal involvement in corporate governance, has criticized 
efforts to "jigsaw" corporate governance problems into existing legislation. Cary, 
supra note 3, at 702. 
105 See H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD CASES AND 
TExT MATERIALs 12 (1980); H. READ, J. MAcDoNALD, J. FoRDHAM & W. PIERCE, 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 318-21 (1973). 
106 It is reasonable to assume that, in the unlikely event that such legislation was 
enacted, it would apply only to corporations of a certain size, as do, for example, the 
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public corporations do not confine their activities primarily to one state but 
are truly national enterprises whose activities are more logically regulated by 
the federal government. Also, federal legislation would mitigate or avoid the 
so-called "race to the bottom" in which, according to some critics, states 
competing for chartering fees make their corporation laws attra,_ctive to 
managements by "watering shareholder rights down to the thin gruel." 101 
Although a legislative solution has certain advantages, it also has two 
major flaws. First is the political improbability of its adoption. Commen-
tators have been arguing for nearly one hundred years for federal chartering 
of public corporations, 108 but the idea does not seem to have gained much 
momentum in all that time. Congress certainly is not eager to adopt such 
legislation now, and political trends are not favorable for its prospects in the 
near future. Professor Cary first proposed federal minimum standards for 
state chartering largely because federal chartering was politically implausi-
ble;109 however, his own proposal has not gained any greater political 
support. Moreover, even those bills recently introduced in Congress con-
cerning corporate governance would not impose the monitoring model on 
corporations. 110 
The prospects for new legislation are even dimmer at the state level. For 
over a century the trend in state corporation laws has been to reduce 
regulations and requirements to a bare minimum. Several factors have 
contributed to this trend. The most notorious has already been mentioned-
the "race to the bottom," the alleged attempt by many states to reduce 
regulations in order to attract corporations to incorporate there and thus to 
reap a harvest of franchise fees. 111 Many have denied that this trend is 
harmful. 112 This race produced a feeling that new state regulation would be 
useless, even counterproductive, because corporations would respond sim-
ply by leaving the state and incorporating elsewhere. 113 Many have also felt, 
proxy and various reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78l-78n & 78p (Supp. II 1980). 
107 Cary, supra note 3, at 666. 
108 See R. NADER, supra note 3, at 65-71; Note, Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123, 125-28 (1972). 
I0 9 Cary, supra note 3, at 700-0 I. 
110 The most prominent such bill is Senator Metzenbaum's proposed Protection of 
Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The section-
by-section analysis of the bill states that "[t]he duty of care provision[] ... directs 
that the director act carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and 
directing the activities of corporate management." [1980] SEc. REo. & L. REP. 
(BNA) F-3 (Apr. 23, 1980). The body of the bill does not bear this out. Section 4(b) 
states the duty of care in terms virtually identical to the Model Business Corporation 
Act's § 35. See text accompanying note 126 infra (quoting from the Model Act). 
111 The phrase was created by Professor Cary. Cary, supra note 3, at 666. The 
phenomenon has been noted by many authors. See note 152 infra. 
112 See sources cited in notes 114 & 154 infra. 
11 3 In 1969, the New Jersey Corporation Law Reform Commission stated: "It is 
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perhaps with considerable justification, that enactment of the federal securi-
ties laws reduced, if not eliminated, the need for state regulation of public 
corporations; that further regulation, if necessary, ought to be undertaken by 
the federal government; and finally, that minimum regulation and maximum 
flexibility are advisable as a matter of public policy .114 
At neither the state nor federal level is there any m;ganized constituency 
pressing for reform of corporate governance. Although investors are not 
indifferent about or unaffected by corporate governance, most lack large 
enough interests to undertake political action and are not sophisticated 
enough to be aware of recent developments in the theory of corporate 
governance. Investors prefer to display dissatisfaction with corporate man-
agement by selling their stock. 115 The best organized and most effective 
lobbyists on corporate governance are corporate executives; they will op-
pose any effort to mandate monitoring. 116 
Even if new legislation were politically feasible, an attempt to codify the 
monitoring model would face immense drafting problems. The monitoring 
model has not yet been sufficiently articulated to permit it to be prescribed 
by detailed legislation. II7 For example, though evaluation of management's 
performance is the keystone of the monitoring model, there are currently no 
concrete standards for such evaluations that could be incorporated into a 
statute mandating monitoring.ll8 Detailed legislation would quickly become 
outdated and unduly restrictive as theory and experience evolved, and 
would not allow for the fact that the situation of each corporation is differ-
ent. 
Alternatively, Congress or a state legislature might empower an adminis-
trative agency to prescribe the duties of corporate boards. 119 On the federal 
level, the SEC might be authorized to define directors' duties, but this is 
clear that the major protections to investors ... have come, and must continue to 
come, from Federal legislation .... Any attempt to provide such regulations ... 
through state incorporation acts ... would only drive corporations out of the state to 
more hospitable jurisdictions."' REPORT OF THE CORPORATION LAW REVISION 
CoMMISSION, in N.J. STAT ANN. tit. 14A, at xi (West 1969) and Cary, supra note 3, 
at 666. See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations. and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. 
L. REV. 433, 478-79 (1968). 
114 See Garrett, The Limited Role of Corporation Statutes, in CoMMENTARIES ON 
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 95, 96-98 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) (Del-
aware is preferred not for nefarious reasons but because of desirable flexibility and 
certainty); Manning, supra note 37, at 17 (liberal state corporation laws ha~e not led 
to "corporate misfortune"); Winter, supra note 71, at 259 (liberal state corporation 
laws benefit shareholders by reducing transaction costs). 
11· C 
, · BROWN, supra note 17, at 25; J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN SHARE-
HOLDER 60-61 (1958); Manning, supra note 37, at 14-19. 
116 s A 
ee nderson, supra note 66, at 782 & n.l30 and authorities cited therein. 
~ 17 See Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 218-25 (statement of Professor Mund-
he1m); notes 36-44 and accompanying text supra. 
118 See notes 233-45 and accompanying text infra. . 
119 
This position is advocated by C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 144 (1975). 
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even less politically feasible than a federal statute that excluded the SEC 
from such power. The business and financial communities are alarmed at the 
Commission's recent attempts to become involved in corporate governance 
and other areas which have traditionally been thought to be outside its 
jurisdiction. 120 Any attempt to give it a blank check to define the director's 
duties would almost certainly meet fierce opposition, opposition which 
would, in light of the Commission's past performance, be entirely war-
ranted.I21 Quite apart from the Commission's shortcomings, theoretical 
objections exist to delegating the power to define directors' duties to an 
administrative agency .122 The current wave of deregulation reflects some of 
these objections. 
Because of the problems with drafting legislation to define directors' 
duties in detail or with delegating this power to an administrative agency, the 
best route to legislative enforcement of the monitoring model would proba-
bly be to enact a very general statute essentially commanding boards to 
monitor effectively. The courts would then give precise content to the 
statute. Although legislation could, consistent with this approach, provide a 
few additional useful weapons for requiring the use of the monitoring 
model, 123 such legislation is largely unnecessary-the director's duty of 
care, part of the statutory or common law of every state, 124 already gives 
courts authority that can be turned to the same purpose. Legislation that 
federalized the duty of care would also provide the procedural advantages of 
federal courts to plaintiffs and promote uniform national standards of care. 
There remains, however, the question that already exists under the state 
law-whether the duty of care can be made an effective weapon for enforc-
ing the monitoring model. 
v. THE DUTY OF CARE 
Corporate directors and officers have long been held to owe the corpora-
tion a duty of care. 125 When stated in the abstract, the duty of care seems to 
12° For example, the SEC's proposal to define directors' duties provoked massive 
criticism. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13,901 (Aug. 29, 1977), [1977-1978 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,296, at 81,087-89,81,094. Other SEC 
proposals relating to corporate governance have provoked similar criticism. 
Grienenberger & McGrath, Reduction in Credibility Stems from Commission Stand 
on Accountability, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 29, col. 1. The authors conclude that 
the result of the SEC's forays into corporate governance "has been confusion in the 
private sector and a reduction in the Commission's credibility." Id. See also H. 
KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 28, 31 (1979). 
121 See generally H. KRIPKE, supra note 92. 
122 Indeed, in 1977 the SEC tried to define directors' duties and abandoned the 
task as impossible. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra. 
123 See A. CONARD, supra note 49, at 913-15. 
124 See notes 126-27 and accompanying text infra. 
125 For some older cases see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Hun v. 
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impose a meaningful obligation on directors and officers. In practice, how-
ever, the duty has had almost no effect on corporate governance for several 
reasons, not the least of which is confusion over the proper functions of 
directors. The evolution of the monitoring model gives a clearer picture of 
what the board can and should do and thereby makes it possible to 
breathe some life into the duty of care. 
A. The Duty of Care: The Ideal and the Reality 
In every state directors and officers are held to owe their corporation a 
duty of care. Many states have embodied this duty in a statute such as 
section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which provides, in 
relevant part, that 
[a] director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as 
a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in 
good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in 
a like position would use under similar circumstances. 126 
The common law or statutory formulation of the duty of care in most states 
is to the same effect. 127 
So stated, the duty of care seems fairly straightforward and rigorous. The 
term "ordinarily prudent person" is a classic negligence standard found in 
many other areas of the law, especially torts. 128 The phrase ''in good faith, in 
a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion," if not completely redundant with the "ordinarily prudent person" 
test, underscores the requirement that the director must act not only with 
ordinary diligence and in good faith but also reasonably. Determination of the 
standard's exact meaning must generally be handled on a case-by-case basis; 
however, this is also true in many other areas of the law and does not 
diminish the rule's clarity. 
Given the long-recognized failure of directors to do much of anything in 
the governance of corporations, 129 one might imagine myriad decisions 
Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atkyns 400,26 Eng. Rep. 642 
(Exch. Ch. 1742). See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, §.§ 1029-1064; 
H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234; Dysori, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 
IND. L.J. 342 (1965). 
126 MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 35 (1976). As to the officer's duty of care, see note 
200 and accompanying text infra. 
127 Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 505-(1975); MoDEL Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN.§ 35, 
Par. 2, ~~ 3-4 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.). See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961); Selheimer v. 
Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966); Neese v. Brown, 218 Tenn. 686, 
405 S.W.2d 577 (1964). 
128 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 32, at 150 (4th ed. 
1971). 
129 See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra. Problems with the diligence of 
.... ________________ _ 
___ _,_ __ _ 
646 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: 623 
holding directors liable for breach of the duty of care. But the duty of care 
h~s long b.een moribun~. As Professor .Bishop expressed .it, cases holding 
drrectors liable for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealmg constitute "a 
very small number of needles in a very large haystaij;k. '' 130 
B. Reasons for Inefficacy of the Duty of Care 
There are numerous reasons for the inefficacy of the duty of care. Several 
courts have expressly rejected the ordinarily prudent man standard in favor 
of a more lenient test, and others have suggested a more lenient standard in 
dicta. 131 Some commentators have argued that court references to bad faith 
gross negligence, and recklessness are not intended to reject the pruden~ 
man standard and that an examination of case holdings, rather than dicta 
bears this out. 132 Perhaps so, but practicing lawyers and commentators giv~ 
credence to dicta; judicial statements appearing to adopt lenient standards of 
care no doubt discourage the bringing of suits and influence the bases on 
which suits are settled even iflawyers have misinterpreted those statements. 
Moreover, courts adheringto the prudent man standard have nevertheless 
mitigated the rigor through the so-called business judgment rule, a doctrine 
of obscure origin and uncertain meaning. It is well established that directors 
are not insurers or guarantors of the corporation's success; 133 indeed, no one 
has ever argued the contrary. Directors owe their corporation duties of 
loyalty and care and if these duties are observed they will not be held liable 
to shareholders or creditors, even if the corporation is not as successful as 
the latter hoped. 134 Apparently trying to say no more than this, some courts 
directors were noted as long ago as 1776, when Adam Smith wrote: 
The directors of Ooint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own .... Negligence and profu-
sion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company. 
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Modern Library ed. 1937). (1st ed. 
London 1776). 
130 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See also C. 
STONE, supra note 119, at 147 ("directors' liability for ordinary negligence is a dead 
letter, and even worse"). 
131 See 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1029, at 12; N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF 
CoRPORATIONS § 78, at 274 & nn.12 & 13 (2d ed. 1971). 
132 Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979). 
133 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N. Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940); H. HENN, supra note 45, 
§ 234, at 454; Comment, Factors That Limit the Negligence Liability of a Corporate 
Executive or Director, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 341, 345, and cases cited at 345 n.38. 
134 See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978) 
(applying Michigan law); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 
723-24 (1912); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1039, at 38; H. HENN, supra note 
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in the last century stated that a director is not liable for mere errors of 
judgment. 135 The "business judgment" rule is incontestable if it is recog-
nized that to invoke the rule the director must exercise his judgment within 
the scope of the duty of care-that is, his judgment must have been 
reasonable and exercised with the care of an ordinarily prudent person. 
However, courts have often described the business judgment rule without 
any reference to the duty of care and, more important, have often dismissed 
suits against directors on the ground of the business judgment rule without 
first inquiring whether the directors had acted reasonably and with due 
diligence. 136 In some cases, courts have simply ignored a statutory "prudent 
man" standard in favor of a fraud or bad faith standard under the business 
judgment rule. 137 Moreover, courts have frequently extended the rule -be-
yond its original purpose; for example, it has been used to prevent share-
holder interference with directors' decisions even though the shareholder 
did not seek to hold the directors liable for their actions .138 
45, § 242; N. LATTIN, supra note 131, § 78, at 272-74; Note, The Continuing Viability 
of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEo. WASH. L. 
REV. 562, 562-63 (1967); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule: A Guide to Corpo-
rate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 151 (1962). 
135 Many of the early cases clearly demanded ordinary or reasonable prudence by 
the director as a condition to his being held not liable. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 
Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) (denying liability "if the error was one into which a 
prudent man might have fallen"); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70-71 (1880) ("if they act 
... using proper prudence and diligence, they are not responsible for mere mistakes 
oreuors ofjudgment"); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., I R.I. 312,348 (1850) 
("The law requires of them care and discretion, such as a man of ordinary prudence 
exercises in his own affairs; and if they practice this, and nevertheless make a 
mistake, the law does not hold them answerable."). See generally Arsht, supra note 
132, at 97-100. 
136 If the business judgment rule requires directors to act with ordinary or reason-
able prudence, a complaint alleging negligence could not ordinarily be dismissed 
without a trial on the issue of fact of negligence. Nonetheless, many shareholder 
derivative suits have been dismissed on summary judgment on the basis of the 
business judgment rule. See, e.g., Ash v. International Business Machs., Inc., 353 
F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 
309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1963); Auerbach v. Bennett, 
47 N .Y.2d 619, 393 N .E.2d 994, 419 N .Y .S.2d 920 (1979); Park off v. General Tel. & 
Elec. Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-5 (N.Y. App. 
Div. Mar. 11, 1980); Bennett v. Instrument Sys. Corp., 66 A.D.2d 708, 411 N .Y.S.2d 
287 (1978). 
137 E.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd on opinion below, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1976) (suit 
dismissed on grounds of business judgment rule without any mention of N.Y. Bus. 
CoRP. LAw§ 717 (McKinney Supp. 1980), which requires directors to act "with that 
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances."). 
. 
138 The most significant example is the judicial extension of the business judgment 
rule to the decision by a board or board committee to terminate a shareholder's 
648 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: 623 
At times, judges justify abstention on the ground that the corporation is to 
be managed by the board, not the shareholders. 139 But many courts refuse to 
recognize that if the duties of care and loyalty mean anything, they must 
mean that courts will intervene at a shareholder's request if the board has 
not acted with due care or loyalty. Courts sometimes dc;ny that they are 
competent to review business decisions. 140 Although courts possess no 
special expertise in business affairs, they also have no special expertise in 
medical malpractice or many other areas in which they often decide whether 
a defendant has acted with reasonable prudence or skill. Nor have they any 
special expertise to decide the complicated environmental and patent cases 
which they routinely face. Courts are not asked to make business policy or 
to decide whether the directors' decisions were the wisest that could have 
been made, but only to decide whether the directors acted with reasonable 
prudence. This question is no more difficult than many others routinely 
decided. 
The business judgment rule's precise impact on the duty of care is 
impossible to determine. Where the rule is held to obviate ajudicial decision 
whether the directors acted with reasonable prudence, whether they did so 
is usually unknown. Many cases would probably have been decided 
differently, however, if the duty of reasonable prudence had not been mod-
ified by the business judgment rule. Moreover, as with dicta suggesting a 
lenient standard of care, 141 even if the business judgment rule has been 
misinterpreted, that misinterpretation is nonetheless a fact that affects litiga- / 
tion and director conduct. 
Also weakening the duty of care is the doctrine of reliance on corporate 
counsel, accountants, and officers. Section 35 of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act provides that "a director shall be entitled to rely on information, 
opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other 
financial data" presented by officers, counsel, public accountants, a commit-
tee of the board, or other persons whom the director reasonably believes to 
be reliable and competent unless ''he has knowledge concerning the matter 
in question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted.'' 142 Statutory 
derivative suit. This application of the rule is in addition to its application to deter-
mine whether any director is liable. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Lewis 
v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 
(Del. Ch. 1980). See generally Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Share-
holder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 (1980). 
m See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 
(1917); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 
762 (3d Cir. 1974 ). 
140 Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,419 N.Y.S.2d 
920, 926 (1979). 
141 See text following note 132 supra. 
142 MoDEL Bus. CoRP. AcT. § 35 (1976). 
I 
1981] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 649 
or common law is to the same effect in most states .143 Courts have faced 
considerable difficulty in defining the scope of the director's right to rely .144 
At one extreme, it might be argued that the directors may rely on the 
opinions of corporate officers in deciding how to vote on any matter placed 
before the board. This interpretation would, of course, be absurd-it would 
allow the director to delegate all his duties to others, leaving him no real 
function at all. But a limiting principle is hard to find. Because most concede, 
implicitly or explicitly, that the board cannot manage the corporation, one 
can hardly deny directors the right to rely on the officers in approving major 
managerial decisions. Thus, recognizing that the directors' only significant 
duty is to man~ge, 145 _it has been difficult to deny directors a right to rely. 
Some courts and commentators also fear that a duty of reasonable pru-
dence would pose such a substantial threat of personal liability that the best 
qualified persons would decline to serve as directors. 146 Under the old model 
of corporate governance this fear may have had some validity. Since outside 
directors cannot manage a corporation, holding them liable for failing to 
manage would deter many from serving as outside directors. If directors 
were assigned tasks they reasonably could perform, however, requiring 
them to perform these duties with reasonable care would not deter qualified 
persons from serving. 147 A more rigorous duty of care would discourage 
143 E.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 7I7 (McKinney Supp. I980). See generally 
/Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and 
Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. I (1976). 
144 Hawes & Sherrard, supra note I43, at 4. 
145 For example, in addition to providing that, with certain exceptions, "[t]he 
business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors," DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § I41(a) (1980 Supp.), 
Delaware General Corporation Law provides that the board may change the lo-
cation of the corporation's registered office, id. § 133; issue shares authorized by 
the certificate, id. § 16I; declare dividends, id. § I70(a); call special meetings of 
stockholders, id. § 21 I (d); fix the record date for meetings of stockholders, id. 
§ 213(a); and fill vacant and newly created directorships, id. § 223(a). Also, both the 
shareholders and the board must approve amendments to the certificate of incorpora-
tion, id. § 242(c)(l); mergers, consolidations, and sales of all or substantially all 
assets, id. §§ 25I(b) & 27I(a); and dissolution of the corporation, id. § 275(a). 
However, even in the absence of such express statutes most, if not all, of these 
powers would probably be deemed implicit in the board's general power to manage 
the corporation. Thus, it is fair to say that the board has few statutory functions other 
than to manage or direct the management of the corporation. 
146 Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 333, 300 A.2d 398, 40I (1964); E. 
McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 106; Symposium, The Greening of the Board Room: 
Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, IO CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. I5, 23-24 
0973) (statement of Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid); Soderquist, Toward a More 
Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 134I, 1349-50 (1977); Comment, supra note 133, at 343. 
147 Indeed, the many directors who resign in disgust because they serve no 
significant corporate role, S. VANCE, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 106 (1978), would 
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those who relish the current state of affairs in which' 'no effort of any kind is 
required" and in which possession of several directorships is '.'like having a 
permanent warm bath.'' 148 But riddance of such directors should be viewed 
as desirable. If a director cannot be required to perform some valuable 
function with reasonable prudence, the corporation would be better off 
saving his fees and avoiding the illusion that he was protecting the share-
holders' interests. 
Some have also feared that the prospect of crushing personal liability for 
simple negligence would force directors to become unduly cautious in 
order to avoid risky ventures that might result in losses to the corporation. 149 
This fear flows from the erroneous assumption that boards actually manage 
corporations. As previously noted, boards do not manage and have little 
influence regarding even major corporate plans; 150 thus, they do not deter-
mine the riskiness of corporate ventures. Rather, the executive officers 
manage the corporation, and recent studies suggest that financial markets 
give management ample, even excessive, incentives to undertake risks to 
maximize corporate profits. 151 
A possible further reason is that a lenient standard of care is part of the 
race to the bottom among the states, an invitation from each state to 
reincorporate there. 152 If this theory were valid, it would be a serious 
obstacle to a revival of the duty of care. However, the theory is largely 
prefer being given meaningful functions. It might be· necessary, however, to limit 
liability for negligence and to increase directors' compensation. 
148 TIME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96, quoted in H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234, at 454 n.3: 
In Britain, where a company's list of directors often reads like a tear sheet from / 
Burke's Peerage, many a titled tycoon sits on more boards than he can count. 
Lord Boothby, 62, a longtime Tory backbencher who is one of this happy breed 
himself (he has 'eight or nine' directorships), explained last week just what 
directors do in return for adding prestige to corporate letterheads. "No effort of 
any kind is called for," he told an audience of Yorkshire clubwomen. "You go to 
meeting once a month in a car supplied by the company. You look both grave 
and sage, and on two occasions say 'I agree,' say 'I don't think so' once, and 
if all goes well, you get $1,440 a year. If you have five of them, it is total heaven 
like having a permanent hot bath." 
149 See Veasey & Manning, supra note 29, at 931-32 (stressing desirability of 
encouraging risk taking); Comment, supra note 133,_ at 343. 
150 See notes 12-17 and accompanying text supra. However, setting ·goals will 
necessarily involve the board in management. See text accompanying notes 234-37 
infra. 
151 See notes 66-67 supra. 
152 See Cary, supra note 3, at 665-66, 670, 683-84. See also Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 
U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The race was not one of diligence 
but of laxity."); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the 
Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991,992-93 (1976); Young, Federal Corporate Law, Federalism, 
and the Federal Courts, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 146, 151 (Summer 1977). Other 
commentators have questioned whether the race to the bottom is undesirable, 
Winter, supra note 71, at 289-92, and even whether such a race exists at all, Manning, 
supra note 37, at 17-18. 
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meritless. Even in Delaware, supposedly the leading instigator of the race to 
the bottom, the courts have shown some zeal recently in holding directors to 
high standards of fiduciary duty. 153 Moreover, unreasonably low fiduciary 
standards would be counterproductive for a state seeking increased corpo-
rate franchise taxes through new incorporations there. Investors would 
avoid the securities of companies incorporated in that state, causing these 
securities to be valued lower in financial markets than securities of com-
panies incorporated in states that provided reasonable protection to inves-
tors. This would induce companies to reincorporate out of the state with 
unreasonably low fiduciary standards. 154 
In light of the weakness of the preceding justifications for leniency in the 
standard of care, the best explanation is the longstanding confusion over the 
proper role of the board of directors. Although state corporation laws long 
provided that the board was to manage the corporation, 155 courts recognized 
that in practice boards do not do so and could not be expected to. With a few 
specific exceptions, 156 state law required nothing more of the board than the 
vague, general duty to manage. Since the only substantial task assigned to 
the board by state law was one the board obviously did not and could not 
fulfill, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable that courts refused to impose 
a high standard of care on directors. This confusion over the board's role, 
not the race to the bottom or judicial indifference to shareholder interests, 
best explains the courts' attitudes. 157 If the monitoring model can eliminate 
/ 
153 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Maldonado v. 
Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). See generally Arsht, supra note 132. 
154 Lorie, supra note 66, at 57; Winter, supra note 71, at 256-58. See R. LARCOM, 
THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 14-15 (1937) (footnote omitted): 
West Virginia had a reputation ... for being the home of irresponsible ~orpora­
tions. lt may have been this reputation which was responsible for the impression 
which one of the gentlemen testifying before the United States Industrial Com-
mission had that "corporations organized in West Virginia· have considerable 
difficulty in placing their stocks and bonds. 
See also Hyman, Do Lenient Stale Incorporation Laws Injure Minority Share!wld-
ers?, in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 166, 168-69 (M. Johnson ed. 1978) 
(prices of a corporation's stock do not drop when the corporation changes its place of 
incorporation to Delaware). Professor Cary himself has recounted the story of a 
South American ambassador in whose country public investors lacked confidence in 
corporations because management considered itself to owe loyalty only to its rela-
tives. Cary, supra note 3, at 671. But Professor Cary does not conclude from this 
story that since shareholders were not fleeing Delaware corporations, Delaware's 
corporation laws must not be detrimental to shareholders' interests. 
155 See note 12 supra. 
156 See note 145 supra. 
157 See C. BRowN, supra note 17, at 5 ("A well-known corporate officer recently 
-observed in public discussion, 'Most boards of directors I have been on don't know 
exactly what they are supposed to do.'"); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 225. See 
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confusion over the board's role and provide directors with an important and 
workable role, courts could reasonably require a more rigorous standard of 
care in their performance. 
Even if the courts had been willing to impose a more stringent director 
duty of care, major obstacles remained to the imposition of personal liability. 
First is the problem of proof of proximate cause. A plaintiff must show not 
only that a director breached his duty of care, but also that this breach led to 
an identifiable loss to the corporation. 15 8 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs have 
rarely been able to prove proximate cause in cases not involving board 
approval of specific transactions. Because directors are expected to do little 
or nothing, proof that their failure to act with due care caused the corpora-
tion some identifiable loss is quite difficult. Although proof of proximate 
cause is a rational requirement and deeply embedded in our jurispru-
dence,159 it has weakened the director's duty of care. 
Even if it can be shown that a director failed to act with due care and that 
this failure caused a corporate loss, .he may still be able to circumvent 
personal liability through indemnification or insurance. Insurance policies 
protect most directors and officers of public corporations against liabilities 
arising out of their position, and most of the premiums for these policies are 
paid by the corporation. 160 When suits are settled or in those rare cases in 
which a director is held liable for negligence, resort to insurance may not 
even be necessary. Some state indemnification statutes· are so broad and 
vague that they might be construed to permit indemnification by the corpora-
tion even for amounts paid in settlement, thus placing on the shareholde'}-' 
the burden of paying for a loss incurred by the director's failure to perform a 
also C. STONE, supra note 119, at 141 ("there is almost no authoritative guide as to 
what., exactly, the directors are supposed to be doing"); Leech & Mundheim, supra 
note 20, at 1803 ("The confusion as to the role and responsibility of the corporate 
director has precipitated serious debate."). 
158 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 151 (1891); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.); H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234, at 456-57. This 
requires proof not only that the board's act or omission caused a specific loss·, but 
also perhaps that each individual defendant-director could have prevented the loss if 
he had acted with due care. See Allied Freightways, Inc. v. Cholfin,.325 Mass. 630, 
91 N.E.2d 765 (1950) (director held not liable because, being unskilled, she could not 
have discovered and prevented the misdeeds); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 
1063.1 ("he is liable only for a loss that results from his negligence"); Dyson, supra 
note 125, at 363-65; Comment, supra note 133, at 342 and cases cited in 342 n.12. But 
see Coffee, supra note 101, at 1213 n.408. 
159 See F. BACON, MAXIMS OF THE LAW, Reg. I, quoted in W. PROSSER, supra 
note 128, § 42, at 244 n.63. 
160 
• • [Tjhe common practice has been for the corpomtion to pay 90 per cent of the 
total premium and the director the remaining 10 per cent." Bishop, supra note 130, at 
1090. Today, it is common for the corporation to pay the entire premium. W. CARY & 
M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 970. 
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duty owed to themP 61 Although no court has embraced this absurd and 
shocking result, insurance is really little different because it too places the 
ultimate burden on the shareholders by having the corporation pay policy 
premiums .162 These results negate the deterrent effect of liability for failure 
to act with due care and, more importantly, they may well contribute in an 
unmeasurable way to the judicial reluctance to impose stricter standards of 
care by instilling a feeling that more rigorous standards would only stir up 
more litigation for the benefit of lawyers with no corresponding benefit to 
shareholders. 
The duty of care has been further weakened by procedural obstacles to its 
enforcement. Unless the director violates the federal securities laws, 
thereby bringing the SEC into action, no public agency is likely to be willing 
or able to sue. Of course, the directors are not likely to sue themselves 
either. Thus, enforcement of the director's duties is relegated almost entirely 
to shareholder derivative suits. 163 But an alleged fear of strike suits-that is, 
suits brought not to benefit the corporation but for the purpose of being 
bought off in a settlement from the defendants or the corporation solely to 
avoid the nuisance of the suit-has prompted state legislatures and courts to 
erect many barriers to the bringing of such suits. 164 These barriers discour-
161 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 1083-84. DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (1974) specifically permits indemnification of attorneys' fees and, 
1I1 nonderivative suits, amounts paid in settlement, judgments, and fines if the 
director "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation." Moreover, this indemnification 
right is not exclusive. Jd. § 145(f). Section 145(b) says nothing about indemnification 
of amounts paid in settlement of derivative suits. Thus, the question is still open in 
Delaware. For an opinion that indemnification is not permitted in such cases, see 
E. FoLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CoRPORATION LAw 100 (1972). The SEC has 
opposed indemnification of directors and officers for violations of the federal se-
curities laws. Note to SEC rule 460, 17. C.P.R. § 230.460 (1980). 
162 Bishop, supra note 130, at 1090-91. 
163 Dean Rostow has called the derivative suit "the most important procedure the 
law has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." Rostow, To 
Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoR-
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 48 (E. Mason ed. 1959). Justice Jackson called it 
"the chief regulator of corporate management." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541,548 (1949). See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 
371 (1942); N. LATTIN, supra note 131, § 115, at 457 ("The derivative suit is the 
minority shareholders' one effective remedy against management's abuse of its 
trusteeship."). 
164 These obstacles include the following requirements: ownership of stock at the 
commencement and during the pendency of the suit; ownership of stock at the time of 
the alleged wrong (the so-called contemporaneous ownership requirement); allega-
~ion with particularity of the facts constituting the corporate cause of action (often 
Interpreted to require the plaintiff in effect to plead evidence); demands on the board 
and the shareholders to take action with respect to the alleged wrong or a showing 
that such demands would be futile; fair representation of the shareholders by the 
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age potential plaintiffs from bringing even meritorious derivative suits. 
In sum, the duty of care has hitherto been an ineffective tool for requiring 
directors to perform a meaningful function within the corporation. This 
ineffectiveness has gone hand in hand, however, with the failure of the 
received model of corporate governance to prescribe any meaningful role for 
the board of directors. Thus, the question arises whether the duty of care can 
be revamped and revived under a monitoring model that in theory provides a 
sound role for the board. 
C. The Monitoring Model and Reviving the Duty of Care 
By abandoning the unrealistic demand that the board manage the corpora-
tion and substituting for it the feasible demand that the board monitor 
management's performance, the monitoring model eliminates most logical 
objections to a rigorous duty of care. The illogical objections should follow 
suit. Although legislation may be desirable on a few specific points, in most 
respects the courts can easily eliminate the obstacles to a more rigorous duty 
of care. 
The claim that courts are incompetent to decide issues of business policy 
has already been rejected in light of the many complicated issues courts 
decide in other areas of the law .165 The fear that a rigorous duty of care 
would discourage qualified persons from serving as outside directors should 
dissipate considerably if directors are given workable tasks instead of the 
vague, unrealistic mandate the law now gives them. We are better off 
without those directors who will serve only if ''no effort of any kind is / 
required." 166 Because monitoring requires more effort than directors have 
traditionally exerted, 167 the directors may demand higher fees, 168 but the 
benefits of monitoring should exceed its costs. Future boards may have to be 
plaintiff; provision by plaintiff of security for expenses of the corporation (including 
attorneys' fees); indemnification of corporate personnel for litigation expenses; 
bringing of suit within the period of a short statute of limitations for certain actions 
against directors, officers, and shareholders; and reimbursement of defendants' ex-
penses. H. HENN, supra note 45, §§ 359, 361-367, 372, 378; N. LATTIN, supra note 
131, §§ 105-06. 
165 See text following note 140 supra. 
166 See note 148 supra (quoting TIME, Oct. 5, 1962, at 96, quoted in H. HENN, 
supra note 45, § 234, at 454 n.3)). 
167 H. KoONTZ, supra note 13, at 151, 232; Goldschrnid, supra note 49, at 175; 
Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 1829. 
168 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 80 (suggesting that directors' compensation 
"should be, in most cases, much higher than at present" and should be ratably 
equivalent to the corporation's senior executives); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 
243; Lohnes, The Selection and Compensation of Outside Directors, in DuTIES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 67, 73-74 (A. Cohen & R. Loeb eds. 
1978); Mundheim, supra note 49, at 181. Some corporations are now paying much 
higher directors' fees. Dean Brown reported in 1976 that Texas Instruments was 
paying some directors about $1,000 per day. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 33. 
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smaller because of the limited number of qualified directors, 169 but this is no 
problem-boards are now unnecessarily large.l1° 
Under the monitoring model, a stringent duty of care should not produce 
unduly cautious corporate policies. Since the board will not make corporate 
policy, it will not be in a position to discourage reasonable risktaking; the 
board will merely monitor the performance of management, and management 
will continue to have ample market incentives to take reasonable risks. 171 
Moreover, if they do have any influence over corporate policies, outside 
directors themselves will have certain market incentives to encourage the 
corporation to take reasonable risks. 172 
The purported competition among states for chartering fees should not 
cause hesitation in state courts to impose a substantial duty of care. Indeed, 
if monitoring truly helps protect shareholder interests and improve corporate 
performance, states would have a motivation to adopt the model in order to 
induce corporations to incorporate there .173 
The monitoring model would also substantially mitigate the problem of 
director reliance on officers, accountants, counsel, and others. With the 
board limited to monitoring management, the reliance issue will only atise 
with respect to monitoring, not company management or any other matter. 
As to monitoring, the board would still have some right to rely on factual 
data provided by management, but in reaching its ultimate decisions the 
board obvj6usly could not rely on the very management it was supposed to 
evaluate. By limiting the scope of the board's duties to monitoring, courts 
will be in a better position to impose a more stringent duty to inquire. Courts 
have been reluctant to require directors to go beyond information presented 
to them by management because outside directors lacked the time and staff 
to investigate all matters independently and because independent investiga-
tions would interfere with orderly management. 174 By restricting the duty to 
inquire to matters of monitoring, this problem would be greatly reduced. 
169 HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., supra note 18, at 4; H. KOONTZ, supra note 13, 
at 151-54. Cf. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 88-90 (supply of outside directors is 
inelastic only in short run); H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 228, 236-37 (shortage is 
largely a product of too narrow a view of what makes a good director). But see 
Friendly, supra note 49, at 529 (there are enough qualified outside directors). 
17° C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 92; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 121 (the ideal 
board should have no more than 13 directors). See HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INc., 
supra note 18, at 4. Committees should be small, generally with no more than three or 
four members; C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 65. 
171 See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. 
172 See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra. 
173 See Winter, supra note 71, at 255-58. 
174 See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 617, (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.), in 
Which the court said a director "had no right to inteiject himself personally" into a 
dispute between officers that helped lead to the corporation's demise. See also 
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra .note 44, at 1603 (" [A]ctual operation is a 
function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to overseeing such 
operation."). 
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The monitoring model will not solve the problem of proof of proximate 
cause. Indeed, although the problem may be somewhat mitigated by the 
reduction of the scope of directors' duties, it may also be exacerbated 
because it will be extremely difficult to prove that an identifiable corporate 
loss resulted from a failure to monitor. For example, failure to replace an 
incompetent management will damage the corporation, but to prove the 
extent of the loss by showing how much better a different, more competent 
management would have done will usually be impossible. However, effec-
tive enforcement of the monitoring model does not necessarily require 
frequent imposition of personal liability on the directors. Both market 
forces 175 and suits for equitable relief can motivate directors to act prudently 
and these can be at least as effective as holding directors liable for negli-
gence. A derivative suit seeking an injunction avoids not only the issue of 
loss causation but also the problem of ultimately shifting liability back to the 
shareholders through indemnification or insurance. 176 It also avoids the 
potential problem of damages being excessive in relation to the magnitude of 
the director's sins. 177 Furthermore, suits for equitable relief promott: a 
dialogue between the courts and corporate boards about the boards' proper 
functions, a dialogue that is especially desirable while the monitoring model 
is in its formative stages. 
Stressing injunctive actions would not, if combined with a more rigorous 
duty of care, eviscerate sanctions for breach. First, the prospect of being 
sued is itself a substantial deterrent for many corporate executives who 
serve as outside directors.l18 The further prospect of being enjoined for 
failure to perform one's duties increases the deterrence. 
More important, courts can use their injunctive powers in imaginative 
ways to improve corporate governance. So far, courts have barely scratched 
the surface of these powers. For example, courts have occasionally enjoined 
defendants from serving as directors, but more often they have held that 
they lack the power to remove directors, except perhaps for fraud. 179 Such 
175 See note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
176 See note 162 mid accompanying text supra. 
177 In the case of any substantial public corporation engaged in transactions worth 
millions of dollars, a damage action for mere negligence could result in crushing 
liability. Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 143, at 3 n.1 (examples of excessive damage 
cases). 
17 8 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 562 ("His reputation and 
prestige in his community may be injured by the bringing of the action alone."); Cary, 
Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 418 (1962) (corporate 
managers are very responsive to public opinion)·. 
m Some courts have removed directors pursuant to their inherent equitable 
powers. Brown v. North Ventura Rd. Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 
568 (1963). Some courts have suggested in dicta that they have such powers. 
Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d 
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947) (no removal unless directors guilty of 
fraud); Gettinger v. Heaney, 127 So. 195 (Ala. 1930) (no removal unless other 
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passivity is unwarranted. Indeed, even if courts feel they cannot or should 
not order reform of a corporation's governance structure where no violation 
of fiduciary duties has been shown, such reform should be considered and, 
where appropriate, mandated when fiduciary duties have been violated. 
Consider, for example, the well-known case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co. 180 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the director 
defendants had not breached their duty of care in failing to discover antitrust 
violations by several corporate officers. Commentary on the case· has fo-
cused on whether the court erred in failing to assess damages .181 The more 
fruitful inquiry would be whether the court erred in deciining to order 
appropriate injunctive relief. If failure to discover the officers' misdeeds 
resulted from the directors' incompetence or lack of time or independence, 
the court could have enjoined the directors from continuing in office and 
taken steps to see that their replacements would be more effective. If the 
solution was ''an internal control system to prevent repeated antitrust viola-
tions," 182 rather than holding the directors liable for failure to install such a 
system (perhaps only to see the directors then made whole by indemnifica-
tion or insurance), 183 the court should have ordered the board to install such 
a system. Such injunctions could provide both guidance to corporate boards 
and practical experience on the basis of which courts might then issue 
injunctions where the corporation had not yet suffered any loss. 184 
Precedents for this approach are found in the corporate governance re-
forms the SEC has obtained as ancillary relief in many consent decrees. 185 It 
remedies inadequate); DeGarmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal. 2d 755, 123 P.2d I, 4 (1942); 
Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128,251 N.W. 421 (Mich. 1933) (no removal unless 
directors guilty of fraud); see Brudney, FiduciGiy Ideology in Transactions Affecting 
Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 281 (1966); Annot., 124 A.L.R. 364 
(1940). In some states the power to remove directors has been conferred by statute. 
CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 304 (Deering 1977); N.C. GEN. STATS. § 55-27(g) (1975); N.Y. 
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 706(d) (McKinney 1976); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1405(c) (Purdon 1967). Other courts have held that they lack power to remove 
directors. Neall v. Hill, 16 Cal. 146 (1860); In re Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 
862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). Professor Stone has recommended removal of direc-
tors for breach of their fiduciary duties, but he contemplates removal pursuant to a 
federal statute or rules of a new Federal Corporations Commission. C. STONE, supra 
note 119, at 149. The view of the author of this Article is that state courts already have 
the power not only to remove directors but to order further corporate governance 
reforms. See note 187 infra. 
180 41 Del. ch: 78, 188 A.2d 125 (S. Ct. 1963). 
181 Cary, supra note 3, at 683. 
182 /d. 
183 See notes 160-62 and accompanying text supra. 
184 Of course, breach of some duty would have to be shown, but failure to institute 
monitoring mechanisms may, in light of future experience, be deemed. to violate the 
duty of care even though no loss has yet occurred. 
185 See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra. 
--------------------
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may be questioned whether obtaining these decrees is beyond the Commis-
sion's statutory powers, 186 but this criticism could not be leveled at state 
courts g_!"anting similar relief. 18 7 Moreover, the SEC has acted in part be-
cause the states have declined to act. If the SEC is not to preempt state 
law in corporate governance, 188 it may be necessary for state courts to play a 
more active role. 
Although injunctive actions should be stressed in enforcing the duty of 
care, damage actions should not be abandoned altogether. The rules pertain-
ing to damage actions, however, should be revised to make them more 
effective and reasonable. Professor Conard wisely suggests that derivative 
suits against directors for breach of the duty of care would be more effective 
if insurance and indemnification against liability were eliminated, 189 and if 
damages were limited, perhaps, to a director's compensation from the cor-
poration for one year .190 This reform would eliminate the prospect of Draco-
nian damages for mere carelessness and with it some of the reluctance of 
courts to impose damages at all. It would also prevent directors from shifting 
to the shareholders, the persons to whom they owe the duty of care, the 
burden of liability for breach of the duty. Although forbidding insurance and 
indemnification would tend to discourage even competent persons from 
serving as directors, 191 limits on personal liability would have the opposite 
effect. 
Limiting damages might occasionally leave insufficient funds to pay 
for the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, the customary practice in derivative 
suits, 192 but such cases would probably be rare. 193 Moreover, an award of 
186 H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 189, 197-98; Comment, supra note 96. 
187 Although courts have been reluctant to order broad injunctive relief in deriva-
tive suits (which are proceedings in equity), there is no doubt that the power to order 
such relief exists. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, §§ 6027-6042; H. HENN, supra 
note 45, § 375. This power permits a court to install a receiver or to order dissolution. 
See note 179 supra. A fortiori, courts have the power to require corporations to 
institute the changes necessary to enable the directors to fulfill their duty of care. 
188 One commentator has opined that "[d]uring the past few years, the SEC has 
been carefully laying the groundwork for extending its jurisdictional reach to preempt 
the state corporation laws." Rosenfeld, Corporate Governance, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 
171, 172 (1979). 
18 9 Conard, supra note 42, at 913-15. 
19o Jd. 
191 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 38 (threat of personal liability now deters 
many from serving as directors); Conard, supra note 42, at 899, 903; note 146 and 
accompanying text supra. Contra, E. McSwEENEY, supra note 20, at 106 ("it is 
widespread frustration [with "the impotence of their positions"], more than fear of 
liability suits, that is most responsible for the decline in the number of persons willing 
to accept directorships."). 
192 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 938-39; H. HENN, supra note 
45, § 377. 
193 If courts limit damage awards as Professor Conard suggests, a major source of 
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damages will often be accompanied by an injunction benefitting the corpora-
tion; this would warrant the payment of attorneys' fees by the corporation if 
damages are insufficient. 194 Although requiring the corporation to pay plain-
tiff's attorneys' fees in effect shifts fees to the shareholders, these fees will be 
much cheaper than indemnification or insurance of the directors against 
liability. 19 5 
The procedural obstacles to plaintiffs in derivative suits that exist 
today will remain under the monitoring model. 196 It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to propose a comprehensive solution· to the problem of permit-
ting meritorious derivative suits without encouraging frivolous strike suits. 
Legislation will be necessary to remedy some problems. 197 However, re-
vamping the duty of care under a monitoring model of corporate governance 
should make the duty more rational from the perspective of both sharehold-
ers and directors and thereby reduce the fears of abuse that have prompted 
creation of many obstacles to derivative suits. 198 For example, by giving 
directors a feasible set of duties, the monitoring model may enhance judicial 
belief that derivative suits to enforce these duties are not merely strike suits 
brought for the benefit of plaintiffs' attorneys. 
By expressly relieving directors of the duty to manage, the monitoring 
model facilitates imposing this duty on the officers. Not only will the duty to 
manage be placed squarely on the executive team, but the board will also 
have an incentive to assign specific managerial tasks to each executive, or at 
least ensure that such an assignment has been made by the chief executive 
officer. 199 Although courts and commentators have long recognized that 
corporate officers owe a duty of care,200 the officers have rarely been held 
contention will be eliminated, making settlements more likely and trials less time-
consuming. Plaintiffs' attorneys already have strong incentives to settle. Alleghany 
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff'd en bane by an 
equally divide'd court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 
(1966). Prohibiting insurance of directors and officers would increase the incentive 
for defendants to settle unless they were confident of exoneration at trial. 
194 Most states now authorize such payments. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, 
supra note 20, at 939; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 377, at 795-96. 
195 Insurance, for example, will often cover both plaintiffs' and defendants' attor-
neys' fees, and perhaps amounts paid in settlement or judgment as well. See Lloyd's 
Open Market Form of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance (ALS (D5)) § 2(c), 
reprinted in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 966. 
196 See note 164 supra. 
197 Many of the obstacles-including the requirements of security for expenses, 
contemporaneous ownership, and demand on the board-are imposed by statute and 
therefore can only be removed by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 
§ 626(b) & (c) (contemporaneous ownership and demand on board) and § 627 
(security for expenses) (McKinney 1976). 
198 See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 525, at 399-400 (1976) 
(abuses led to imposition of many procedural obstacles to derivative suits). 
199 See notes 284-86 and accompanying text infra. 
200 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1032; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234. See 
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liable for breach of this duty201 because under the received model of corpo-
rate governance the board was supposed to manage and the officers merely 
carried out the board's orders. The courts were also reluctant to hold the 
board liable for mismanagement, however, because the board was incapable 
of managing. 202 By assigning the officers the duty to manage and ensuring that 
specific management tasks are delegated to specific officers, the monitoring 
model remedies this problem. 
Moreover, by requiring the officers to manage, the monitoring model 
eliminates many justifications for the evisceration of the duty to manage 
carefully. Under the received model, the courts insisted on a common 
standard of care for both inside and outside directors; rather than selecting a 
high standard that would have been appropriate for inside directors, they 
invariably adopted a low standard appropriate for outside directors.2°3 With 
management delegated to the officers, there is no reason not to insist on a 
higher standard of care. A review of the factors that have contributed to the 
weakening of the duty to manage carefully make this apparent. The defense 
of reliance on information and opinions of others204 makes sense with 
respect to management by outside directors because they lack independent 
sources of information and the time and expertise to form opinions on 
difficult management questions. Not so with the officers; their right to rely 
should bt< strictly circumscribed. Another justification for avoiding a strin-
gent duty to manage carefully was that it would deter the best outside 
directors from serving-directors' fees have never been large enough, in and 
of themselves, to induce the best to serve, and the position's honor could 
quickly be outweighed by any substantial threat of liability. However, these 
concerns are much less compelling, if applicable at all, when officers are 
involved; a stringent duty of care will not prompt officers to resign to 
become something other than corporate executives. If outside directors 
were required to manage, a rigorous duty of care might force them to be too 
cautious because no potential reward would offset the potential liability for 
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw§ 715(h) (McKinney 1976). Section 35 of the ModelBusiness 
Corporation Act did not include officers within the statutory duty of care because of 
problems in an officer's right to rely, though the Comment to section 35 noted that ''a 
. non-director offic.~r may have a duty of care similar to that of a director as set forth in 
section 35." MonEL Bus. CoRP. ACT. ANN.§ 35, Par. I, at 256 (2d ed. 1977 Supp.). 
201 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1032 ("Most of the decisions involving 
the question as to the required degree of care are expressly limited to directors, and 
there is very little law as to the degree of care required of other officers.") See also 3 
id. § 991, at 522. 
202 See notes 18-29 and accompanying text supra. 
203 This has been particularly evident with respect to the board's duty to super-
~ise, where the courts have based standards of care on the outside director who 
devotes little time to the business. See Graham, 41 Del. Ch. at 84-86, 188 A.2d at 
130-31. 
204 See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra. 
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taking substantial risks. The officers, however, would not be too cautious 
because they have large potential rewards for risk-taking in the form of 
bonuses, larger salaries, enhanced value of stock and stock options, greater 
job security, and greater value in the job market if ventures succeed.205 
Proof of proximate cause has created major problems under the received 
model. 206 The monitoring model can ameliorate these problems if not elimi-
nate them completely. Since all managerial tasks rest with the entire board 
under the traditional model, a director's duty as to any single task is neces-
sarily spread thin. If each managerial task were assigned to a specific officer, 
this problem would diminish. Even a reasonably diligent outside director 
cannot be held to a high standard of effort or expertise in making manage-
ment decisions, but an officer can be. 
Although obstacles to derivative suits will remain under the monitoring 
model, the rationalization of liability outlined above should help persuade 
courts and perhaps legislatures to reduce those obstacles. 207 Derivative suits 
could then become an effective tool, working in tandem with monitoring by 
the board, toward the desired end of effective corporate governance. 
D. Summation 
The courts' refusal to impose a rigorous duty of care is best explained by 
the confusion generated by the traditional model of corporate governance. 
The monitoring model of corporate governance removes this confusion and 
thereby eliminates most objections to a rigorous duty of care. It remains to 
be determined, however, to what extent a court could in practice require and 
enforce monitoring. 
VI. TOWARD ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS FOR MONITORING 
Although adoption of the monitoring model of corporate governance 
clears the way for a shift in judicial attitudes towards the duty of care, courts 
cannot effectively enforce the duty unless there are workable, enforceable 
standards for monitoring. Without such standards, the monitoring model 
may become little more than a pious wish that the directors do something 
good, with no penalty if they persist in doing virtually nothing. 
An initial question is where courts can find authority to require directors 
to monitor. The command, now contained in many state statutes, that the 
corporation shall be managed ''under the direction of'' a board of direc-
tors208 could be easily construed to require monitoring once courts concede 
that this is the one important function that the board can perform. 209 In the 
205 See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. 
206 See notes 158-59 and accompanying text supra. 
207 See note 198 and accompanying text supra. 
208 See note 31 and accompanying text supra. 
2o9 s M 
ee . EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 156-68 (discussion of importance of 
monitoring as main board function). 
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few states in which statutes still provide that the board shall manage the 
corporation, it may be a bit harder for the courts to reach this result-but not 
unduly so, because of the general agreement that boards do not and cannot 
manage. Indeed, court-imposed duties already anticipate certain aspects of 
monitoring. For example, courts often recognize a directorial duty to super-
vise subordiiiates210 and to inquire when put on notice that the corporation is 
being mismanaged. 211 If the courts can fashion a duty to supervise and to 
inquire about mismanagement, they should be able, supported by recent 
developments in corporate governance theory, to fashion a duty to moni-
tor. 212 Whether this broad duty can lead to concrete, enforceable rules will 
be discussed below. 
Most proponents of monitoring identify discrete duties the board would 
perform and advocate the discharge of these duties through a system of 
board committees. 213 Corporate practice has recently moved in a similar 
direction.21 4 Accordingly, the remainder of this section will be organized 
into discussion of these duties-evaluation of management's performance 
and determination of management's compensation; evaluation of incumbent 
directors and nomination of new directors; overseeing corporate accounting 
practices and audits; monitoring compliance with the law; allocating man-
agerial duties to officers; and reviewing interested transactions. In practice, 
much board work must be delegated to committees if, as is contemplated by 
the monitoring model, part-time outside directors are to dominate the 
board. 215 To perform any single major monitoring function effectively will 
require a greater time commitment than outside directors have previously 
given. 216 Without committees, no director could properly perform all these 
functions and yet serve only part-time. 
210 See H. HENN, supra note 45, § 234. 
211 See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1920); Graham, 41 Del. Ch. at 84, 
188 A.2d at 130 (S. Ct. 1963) ("[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and 
integ!ity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that 
something is wrong."); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 1078. 
212 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 21 ("'The dictum in state charters that the 
corporation 'shall be managed by the board of directors' can only mean that general 
control and direction of corporate affairs and the supervision of the corporate 
officers, to whom the day-to-day management is delegated, belongs to the board."). 
Cf. Mundheim, supra note 49, at 181 (courts might hold that ordinary prudence 
requires directors of a public corporation to have or establish an audit committee). 
213 C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 62, 64--65; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 
170-71; Hams, Directors of Industrial Companies: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 
1235, 1239-40 (1976). 
214 See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra. As to the frequency of compen-
sation, nominating, and audit committees, see notes 219, 252, & 265 infra. 
215 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 62, 64-65; H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 
170-71; Harris, supra note 213, at 139-40; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 20, at 
1807-09. 
216 See notes 26 & 167 supra. 
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A. Evaluation of Management's Performance and Determination of 
Management's Compensation 
663 
The core concept of the monitoring model is that the board, though 
incapable of managing the corporation, can and should monitor man-
agement's performance.217 Accordingly, the key function of the monitoring 
board is to evaluate management's performance. Corollary duties include 
rewarding superior management with increased compensation, discharging 
incompetent managers, and filling management vacancies. Many corpora-
tions have recently established compensation committees, 218 but few have 
authority to suggest the discharge of managers, to fill vacancies, or even to 
evaluate management's performance.219 Moreover, existing compensation 
committees often include inside directors. 220 Thus, outside directors now 
rarely evaluate management's performance and, except in extreme emer-
gencies,221 do not discharge managers or fill managerial vacancies. 
Business commentators discussing evaluation of management's perfor-
mance have generally advocated management by objectives and appraisal by 
results. Management by objectives entails the establishment of quantifiable 
goals against which the managers' performance will be measured. Appraisal 
by results is the subsequent evaluation of the managers' performance, taking 
into account not only success or failure in meeting the established goals but 
also external factors affecting that success or failure but not anticipated 
when the goals were set. 222 Some have objected that quantifiable goals may 
217 C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 26, 30; E. McSwEENEY, supra note 20, at 105; 
Conrad, supra note 42, at 917; Mace, supra note 26, at 21; Manning, supra note 37, at 
27-28. 
218 One study showed that between 1973 and 1977, the proportion of surveyed 
corporations that had compensation committees grew from 76.1% to 87.6%. KoRN/ 
FERRY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18, at II. 
219 The duty traditionally assigned to the compensation committee is to determine 
whether the corporation's executive compensation is adequate to attract and retain 
highly qualified management and to encourage "extraordinary effort through incen-
tive awards." ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the 
Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837, 1848 (1979). A few corporations do, how-
ever, encourage board evaluation of management. See R. MuELLER, BoARD CoM-
PASS 73 (1979) (discussing Pillsbury Co. and Massachusetts Mutual Life ins. Co.); R. 
MUELLER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DIRECTORS 48 (1978) (discussing Continental Tele-
phone Corp.). Most boards do not, however: evaluate management's performance in 
any depth. C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 26. 
220 In a recent survey by the SEC, over 40% of the companies with compensation 
committees had at least one committee member with a relationship listed in Item 6(b) 
of Schedule 14A. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,158, Table 15, SEC Docket 
155!, 1573 (Feb. 5, 1981). 
221 M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 65, 70. But see Bauer, Why Big Business Is Firing 
the Boss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6, at 22, col. I, indicating that dismissal of 
high-level executives is becoming more common. 
222 H. KOONTZ, APPRAISING MANAGERS AS MANAGERS 80 (1971); H. SMITH 
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work well at lower echelons, where more tangible tasks are performed, but 
not at the level of top management; nonetheless, they argue that manage-
ment can be evaluated as to its qualitative performance of more nebulous 
tasks; such as planning, staffing, and discharging corporate social respon-
sibilities. 223 
This approach to evaluating management's performance arguably has much 
to recommend it. Evaluation of lower level managers by top management is 
an inherent part of any but the smallest business. In fact, a central feature in 
the evolution of the modern multidivisional public corporation was the" cre-
ation of an executive management divorced from operations and devoted 
solely to long range planning and to evaluating the performance of operating 
units. 224 One problem not solved by the multidivisional form is that execu-
tive management may be incompetent or may pursue nonprofit goals, such 
as growth, with no restraint other than the threat of takeover225-a threat 
inadequate by itself to ensure competence or pursuit of maximum profits. 226 
Evaluation .of management by nonmanagement directors is a logical exten~ 
sion of the multidivisional form and may help solve this problem. 227 -
The existence of an independent board committee which would evaluate 
management and mete out appropriate reward or punishment and which 
might announce its conclusions publicly228 should itself motivate manage-
& P. BROUWER, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 77 (1977); 
Wikstrom, Management by Objectives or Appraisal by Results, in MoDERN MAN-
AGEMENT: ISSUES AND IDEAS 436 (D. Hampton ed. 1969). 
223 H. SMITH & P. BROUWER, supra note 222, at 81 ("A simple, quantitative 
approach to 'management by objectives' may work well at lower echelons ... but it 
is likely to be inappropriate at higher levels in the organizations."); Burton, supra 
note 68, at 486. 
224 A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 6-12 passim (1977). See generally A. CHANDLER, supra note 
15, at 1-17. 
225 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 75, at 165-66. 
22 6 See notes 71 & 75 and accompanying text supra. 
227 Another approach to evaluating management is the management audit. Com-
mentators do not completely agree on what this is. Most see it as an evaluation to be 
conducted by independent certified public accountants, but whether this audit would 
be intended primarily to rate management or merely to give it advice is not clear. See 
M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 210-11; H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 179 and 
authorities cited at 179 n.6; Burton, supra note 68; Campfield, Management Audit-
ing: Pathway to Efficient, Economical Operations, 35 INTERNAL AUDITOR 33 (Apr. 
1978). Others see the management audit as being performed or commissioned by 
outside director. See Smith, Pe1jormance Audits by Outside Directors, in CoRPO-
RATE DIRECTORS CoNFERENCE, THE CoRPORATE DIRECTOR: NEw RoLES, NEW 
RESPONSIBILITIES 65 (1975); Wilde & Vancil, Pe1jormance Audits by Outside Direc-
tors, 50 HARV. Bus. REv. 112 (July-Aug. 1972). 
228 Public disclosure of board evaluations of management might increase man-
agement's hostility to the board and opposition to monitoring. There is also the 
danger that public disclosures of corporate goals might be deemed predictions that 
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ment to perlorm better. It should also improve management's planning and 
control, and help to clarify organization roles. 229 The benefits of board 
evaluation of management will be greatest in those companies in which 
competition in product and capital markets is least effective, because it 
would furnish rewards and punishments that these markets ordinarily pro-
vide. If securities analysts believe the board to be truly competent and 
independent, the board's evaluation could become a significant piece of 
market information. 230 Management compensation structures and the capital 
market's preoccupation with short-term perlormance currently force man-
agement to stress short -term results. 231 However, the board can encourage 
management to give greater emphasis to long range goals, especially if 
capital markets come to rely on board evaluations so that stock prices and 
takeover threats do not depend so heavily on short-term profits. 23 2 
would give rise to securities law violations unless carefully framed. On the other 
hand, disclosure might serve as an additional incentive for management to perform 
well. Moreover, hoard evaluations cannot become market information, see text 
accompanying note 230 infra, unless publicly disclosed. If the board's evaluation 
becomes material information, SEC rule lOb-5 would prevent insiders from trading in 
the corporation's stock until the evaluation was disclosed. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In 
fact, disclosure might be required even if the insiders were not trading in the stock. 
See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 83, at 949-50. 
229 H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 81-83. 
230 This is because the board, as part of the corporate governance structure, has 
better access to corporate information and can get better cooperation from manage-
ment than market analysts. Therefore, it can make a better informed evaluation. 
0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS 146-47 (1975). The importance of the evaluation of management in invest-
ment decisions cannot be doubted. Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); New 
Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAw. 505, 530-31 
(1973) (ABA Panel) (remarks of Harold Marsh, Jr.). It is not far-fetched to imagine 
that markets would rely on outside directors. Shareholders and underwriters have 
insisted that public companies add outsiders to their boards. H. KooNTZ, supra note 
13, at 130-32. 
231 Indeed, the obsession of American corporate managers with short~term profits 
has itself become an obsession with commentators on American business. During 
just a few weeks while this Article was in preparation the author noted the following in 
the New York Times: Hayes, Managers Adopting Long-Term Outlook, Jan. 11, 
1981, § 12, at40, col. 1; Arenson, Economists: Influential But Erratic, Jan. 11,1981, § 
12, at 42, col. 3; Thurow, Productivity: Japan Has a Better Way, Feb. 8, 1981, § 3, at 
2, col. 4; Interview with Reginald H. Jones, How to Improve Management, Jan. 27, 
1981, § D, at 2, col. 1; Bauer, supra note 221, at 86, col. 4 (quoting an expert on 
executive compensation: "Contracts have, more and more, called for bonuses tied 
to short-term performance .... "). 
232 See C. BROWN, supra note 17, at 6 (boards may take a longer range view than 
does management). Professor Williamson notes the possibility that internal auditors 
may, because of their superior access to information and cooperation, be better able 
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Corporate governance would improve substantially if board evaluation of 
management produced all these benefits and if the duty of care or some othe 
legal norm required boards to evaluate management effectively and inde~ 
pendently. Unfortunately, many problems exist with both the theory of 
board evaluation and the enforcement of a duty to evaluate. 
An initial problem is determining who will set management's goals. Man-
agement, not the outside directors, currently sets goals and performs other 
important functions. 233 Professor Eisenberg believes that the board should 
set goals and denies that this would involve the board in the corporation's 
long-range planning. In his view, "it is one thing, for example, to demand a 
certain return on capital; it is another to decide on the strategy and tactics 
which promise to yield that return.' ' 234 The dichotomy between setting goals 
and choosing means to attain those goals is not, however, as clear as 
Professor Eisenberg suggests. Management can be expected to argue that 
the board has set goals too high. 235 Disagreements between the board and 
management over corporate goals could not only disrupt the firm but also 
diminish market reliance on the board's evaluation by raising questions 
about its validity. Independent objective standards to which the board or 
management could refer in setting goals or evaluating performance are quite 
rare. Two or more firms are seldom so similar that a useful comparison of 
their results is possible. 236 Information about competitors, especially con-
cerning long-range plans, may be difficult to obtain at all or, at least, in time 
to make useful comparisons. 237 Even comparisons with a competitor will not 
be very helpful if the quality of the competitor's management is unknown-
that is, outperforming a competitor means little if the competitor is incompe-
tently managed. 
Professor Eisenberg's dichotomy also ignores risk factors in setting 
to encourage risk-taking than the capital markets. But he also notes some doubt 
whether these "potential advantages ... actually induce more aggressive risk-
taking." 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 230, at 146 n.10. 
233 See note 17 and accompanying text supra. 
234 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 165. 
135 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 86 ("(Tjhere is a natural tendency for 
subordinates to build padding into goals to assure they will exceed them."); E. 
McSWEENEY, supra note 20, at 107 ("Even with a very cooperative CEO to work 
with, setting up a specific table of performance standards is likely to be a touchy, 
complex and unpleasant job."); H. SMITH & P. BROUWER, supra note 222, at 77 
("There is always potential for conflict in the process of setting objectives."). 
Although management's self-interest makes such objections suspect, management's 
superior knowledge of the company would lend credibility to its arguments. 
236 See Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at 113. See also Speech by SEC Chairman 
Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 10 ("It is, of course, impossible to generalize the 
appropriate performance standards applicable to every corporation. Nor can stan-
dardized check-lists adequately meet the individual needs of particular enter-
prises."). 
237 See Friendly, supra note 49, at 530. 
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financial goals. Higher goals require taking greater risks. 238 In setting goals, 
the board would thus profoundly influence corporate policy and perhaps lead 
the corporation to ruin if, for example, unreasonably high goals forced 
management to pursue unduly risky policies. High short-term profitability 
goals could force management to pursue unwise policies regarding research 
and development, maintenance and repair, accounting procedures, or other 
matters that would be very detrimental in the long-term.239 If the board does 
not want management to disregard the future completely, it must set goals 
for product, plant, and market development and similar matters in addition 
to short-term profit. But selecting matters which management must concen-
trate on involves the board even more deeply in corporate planning. In sum, 
setting goals will invite disputes between management and the board. More-
over, it will necessarily require the board to make policy, in contradiction of 
the tenet that the board is competent only to evaluate management, not itself 
to manage. 
The requirement to set goals also creates a tendency to stress quan-
tifiable, short-term factors in order to facilitate a quick objective determina-
tion whether the goals have been met. 240 The tendency is understandable for 
several reasons. First, it is difficult to verify that nonquantifiable objectives 
have been met. 241 Second, setting long-range goals is difficult because long-
term conditions are much harder to predict than are short-term conditions. 
And finally, both the evaluators and the evaluated need regular, fairly 
frequent evaluations if either is to benefit thereby. Nonetheless, the ten-
dency to stress short-term quantifiable factors negates some important pre-
sumed benefits of monitoring. It not only defeats the goal of encouraging fair 
consideration of long-range and nonquantifiable objectives but actually fur-
ther diverts management from these objectives-that is, it prompts man-
agement to concentrate on matters which will be evaluated, at the expense of 
other objectives. 242 
238 To accept greater risk investors demand higher expected returns. J. VAN 
HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 63-65 (4th ed. 1977). It follows that 
to aim for higher returns one must accept greater risk. 
m See Bauer, supra note 221, at 86-87, for a description of how a CEO can boost 
short-term profits at the expense of long-run profits. 
240 See H. KoONTZ, supra note 222, at 86, 89-90, 96; Speech by SEC Chairman 
Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 16 ("In many corporations the board relies 
exclusively on current performance figures to determine the corporation's position, 
as well as to evaluate and reward management. This situation compounds man-
agement's own frequent tendency to have a short-term, bottom-line oriented 
focus-a myopia which could have a severely negative impact on the corporation's 
future."). Meaningless financials complicate the problem. But see R. SLOMA, How 
TO MEASURE MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 3-4 (1980); Wilde & Vancil, supra note 
227, at 115-16. 
241 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 95-96, 104-05, 110-11; Burton, supra note 
68, at 490. 
242 See H~ KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 87-89; Wikstrom, supra note 222, at 439-40. 
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Evaluation of results is invariably complicated by conditions unforeseen 
when the goals were set. 243 When goals are not met, management is espe-
cially likely to blame unexpected conditions. This places the board in an 
awkward position: if it rejects this plea, squabbles between the board and 
management will follow; if it makes concessions, market reliance on its 
evaluations may be undermined by doubts as to the board's independence, 
vigor, or competence. If goals are not quantified, the board must still deter-
mine whether the goals have been met, which raises the possibility of 
further disputes between board and management. 
To enforce the duty to monitor, courts may be able to impose some 
procedural standards on directors with respect to evaluating management. 
For example, a court might hold that the duty of care, including the duty to 
monitor, requires that the board establish formal mechanisms to evaluate 
management and perhaps even establish goals as part of these mechanisms. 
By requiring evaluators both to spend a reasonable amount of time evaluat-
ing management and to have no conflicts of interest, the court could in effect 
require boards to establish evaluation committees composed entirely of 
outside directors. These requirements might substantially improve board 
behavior. Independent-minded directors may now hesitate to evaluate man~ 
agement for fear that this may be deemed adversarial and therefore inappro-
priate. 244 A legal requirement that boards evaluate management would over-
come this reluctance. Directors too timid to monitor might decide to resign. 
Most directors are competent businessmen who, if they are to do ajob at all, 
want to do it well; therefore, if courts require boards to establish mecha-
nisms to evaluate managements, many boards will perform the task as 
energetically and competently as possible. Despite the difficulties with 
evaluating that were discussed above, these evaluations will be preferable to 
the current total absence of independent evaluation of management. 
But the problems courts will face in trying to impose any substantive 
standards on board evaluations will probably limit the benefits described 
above. As we observed, there are no objective standards for setting goals, 
determining whether they were met, or, if they were not, why not. 245 If a 
board will not evaluate management carefully and objectively, it can 
nonetheless produce a large paper record of its activities, thereby conveying 
the appearance of a good faith effort. Unless the directors are so careless as 
to leave evidence of bad faith in the record, a court will find it almost 
243 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 87-88; Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at 
114. 
244 Corporate Director's Guidebook: Comments Submitted by the American Soci-
ety of Corporate Secretaries, 33 Bus. LAW. 321,322,326-27 (1977). "The monitoring 
posited by the Corporate Director's Guidebook could lead to an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust," "of caution and hostility." !d. at 326-27. 
245 See H. KooNTZ, supra note 222, at 110-11, 179; E. McSwEENEY, supra note 
20, at 106-07; Burton, supra note 68, at 486, 490; Wilde & Vancil, supra note 227, at 
114. 
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impossible, except in the most extreme cases, to hold that the board has 
acted negligently in its evaluations. 
The problem of establishing substantive judicial standards will also afflict 
judicial review of executive compensation. Indeed, this has long been the 
case in both the corporate and tax law areas. Since managements control 
most public corporations, 246 and thus set their own salaries, one would 
expect such salaries frequently to be excessive. Although all courts agree 
that compensation must be reasonable,247 and although the cases enumerate 
factors relevant to reasonableness,248 courts almost invariably refuse to hold 
compensation excessive. 249 Some courts have expressly despaired of finding 
any satisfactory yardstick by which to measure the reasonableness of com-
pensation. 250 Independent boards as envisioned by the monitoring model 
could make executive compensation more reasonable on their own initiative. 
Courts could encourage this by demanding the procedures described above, 
but it would probably be unworkable to force boards to scale back executive 
compensation by imposing substantive limits. 
In sum, although evaluation of management and determination of its 
compensation by an independent board or board committee may somewhat 
improve corporate governance, the benefits are unlikely to be great. The 
difficulties are considerable in both effectuating the directors' tasks and 
enforcing the duty to evaluate and to set compensation. 
B. Noinination of Directors 
For a board to function effectively, its members must be both competent 
and independent of management. Although monitoring adds no problems to 
the issue of determining who is independent, it increases the importance of 
246 See notes 13-28 and accompanying text supra. 
247 See H. HENN, supra note 45, § 245, at 487-88 and cases cited in 488 n.16. 
248 See 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 2133, at 576-77, and cases cited therein; 2 
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CoRPORATE EXECUTIVE 
855-63 (3d ed. 1962) (listing factors considered in close corporation cases). The issue 
has been litigated most frequently in the federal income tax area in connection with 
the deduction of alleged salaries. See authorities cited in H. HENN, supr,a note 45, 
§ 245, at 488 n.16. 
249 
"In reading the cases, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the courts 
will go to almost any length to avoid a clear holding on the reasonableness of 
compensation. They seem bold in pronouncing amounts unreasonable only when 
they have already found some other basis for decision." 2 G. WASHINGTON & V. 
ROTHSCHILD, supra note 248, at 866-67; accord, 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 43, 
§ 2133, at 575 ("The Courts are loath to interfere even though the amount may appear 
to be in excess of the value of the services rendered."). Moreover, the trend seems to 
be toward greater reluctance to hold compensation unreasonable. See 2 G. 
WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 248, at 862. 
250 See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 
263 A.D. 814, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941). 
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independence by giving the board the quasi-adversarial task of overseeing and 
evaluating management. The model does pose additional problems regarding 
the competence of directors, however, by giving them new tasks to perform. 
At the same time, it increases the importance of competence because for the 
first time directors will play a significant role in corporate governance. 
Securing competent directors and ensuring their independence has been a 
perennial problem. This Article will next consider the functioning of the 
monitoring model with respect to the selection of competent, independent 
directors and discuss whether courts can, under the duty of care, develop 
enforceable rules to improve the process. 
The problem of securing independent directors begins with the chief 
executive officer's leverage over director retention and selection. 251 Al-
though the monitoring model does not directly affect the selection of direc-
tors, it may reduce this leverage in several ways and thereby promote the 
selection of more independent directors. The creation of a nominating com-
mittee composed primarily or, preferably, exclusively of outside directors 
helps insulate the selection process from the chief executive officer, at least 
if the chief is not a committee member. In the last few years many corpora-
tions have established such nominating committees. 252 
Can a court require a corporation to have a certain percentage (perhaps a 
majority) of outside, independent directors? Under the monitoring model, 
one can cogently argue the affirmative. The model divests the board of the 
duty to manage, a duty for which insiders are well suited, and instead 
commands the board to monitor insiders, a task for which outsiders are not 
only better suited but necessary if conflicts of interest are to be avoided. A 
court could reasonably hold that the duty of the board is to monitor man-
agement; that the insiders, as members of management, cannot monitor 
themselves; and, therefore, that the ordinary prudence demanded by the 
duty of care requires the board to select and retain a majority of outside 
directors. 
At least for the next several years, however, no court is likely to adopt this 
position. Until recently, a board with a majority of insiders was the rule, and 
many boards are still dominated by a combination of inside and affiliated 
directors. 253 Moreover, some studies have concluded that inside boards are 
more effective than outside boards. 254 To demand a majority of independent 
25 1 See M. MAcE, supra note 13, at 94-95: Solomon,supra note 3, at 605. 
25 2 A survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries showed that of 993 
responding companies the number with nominating committees grew between 1975 
and 1978 from Ill to 297. American Society of Corporate Secretaries, The Overview 
Committees of the Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1361 (1980). Of over 
1,000 public companies recently surveyed by the SEC, 68.4% had compensation 
committees. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,518, SEC Docket 1551, 1567 
(Feb. 5, 1981). 
25 3 See note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
25 4 S. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 5 
1981] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 671 
directors, then, will probably be too radical a change for the common law to 
take. 
Nonetheless, courts may well use the duty of care to require that oversight 
committees, central to the monitoring model, 255 be created and staffed 
entirely or predominantly by independent directors. Since oversight commit-
tees are a fairly new development, this would not be so radical a departure 
from time-honored practices. A nominat'ing committee should have authority 
to nominate directors for committee membership. New directors could then 
be selected with a view to their ability to serve on specific committees. This 
approach would ensure that important monitoring functions will be per-
formed by independent committees without abandoning the ancient and 
revered fiction that the board manages the corporation. 
Requiring outsider-dominated oversight committees while permitting 
insider-dominated boards would be a step forward but would not ensure 
effective monitoring. The action of any board committee would probably be 
subject to revision by the entire board. 256 Moreover, insiders who dominate 
the entire board would be free to select and remove the committee members, 
thereby ensuring favorable composition of these committees. The constant 
threat of removal or nonreelection could compromise the independence of 
outside directors and help preserve current boardroom etiquette, which 
dictates that outsiders not rock the boat. 
Because directors have traditionally done little of importance for the 
corporation, 257 their competence has generally been unimportant. Although 
(1964); Schmidt, Does Board Composition Really Make a Difference?, 12 CONF. Bn. 
REc. 38 (Oct. 1975). But see H. KooNTZ, supra note 13, at 129-32, disputing Vance's 
position and noting that virtually every study confirms the desirability of having 
outside directors, and that shareholders and underwriters have insisted on outside 
directors to protect against "myopia" and "the abuse of powers." 
255 See notes 213-16 and accompanying text supra. 
256 Several states expressly provide that the committee shall serve at the pleasure 
of the board, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw§ 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1980); OHIO REv. 
ConE ANN.§ 1701.63(c) (Anderson 1978), or that a majority of the full board may 
"(c) abolish any such committee at ;ts pleasure; and (d) remove any director from 
membership on such committee at any time, with or without cause," N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:6-9(2) (West Supp. 1980), or that the committee shall be subject to the 
direction and control of the board, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4)(8) (West Supp. 
1979). See also 7 F. WHITE, NEw YoRK CoRPORATION ~ 712.03 (13th ed. 1979). If 
the statute does not grant and the full board does not expressly reserve such power, 
whether the board may dissolve or overrule a committee is unclear. Several courts 
have held, notwithstanding the literal language of the relevant statutes, that the board 
is limited in the powers it can delegate to a committee. E.g., Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & 
Plant S.S. Co., 181 F.289 (1st Cir. 1910); see Note, Executive Committees-
Creation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42, 59-63. One commen-
tator has suggested that because the committee is created by the board to assist in 
management, • 'there should be no question that the board may control the executive 
committee." Id. at 47. 
257 See notes 15-17, 23, & 26-27 and accompanying text supra. 
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most outside directors are corporate executives258 and no doubt competent 
businessmen, the law has not often required directors to possess any 
special skills. 259 The Corporate Directors' Guidebook, for example, refers to 
such vague attributes as prudence and practical wisdom. 260 Monitoring may, 
however, require particular skills for the effective functioning of the over-
sight committees. For example, evaluation of a given management's perfor-
mance by an evaluation and compensation committee will require consider-
able sophistication. This will also be true for membership on an audit 
committee, especially if that committee is to review accounting procedures 
as well as guard against misuse of corporate funds. 261 
Competence is a more nebulous quality than independence, but courts 
might nevertheless impose some meaningful limits in this area. Although 
courts have not traditionally required that directors possess any particular 
skills, 262 they might indirectly impose such a requirement by holding that the 
duty of care requires the board to nominate as new directors only persons 
who possess some minimum skills. 263 Requirements would be easier to 
impose if the director will be nominated for a committee that requires some 
expertise. For example, a court could well hold that a reasonably prudent 
person would not agree to sit on an audit committee, and that reasonably 
prudent directors would not elect one of their number for an audit commit-
tee, unless the candidate had substantial acquaintance with auditing and 
accounting procedures. 
In addition to demanding competence and independence, monitoring also 
requires outside directors to devote more time to their positions than they 
traditionally have given. Few outsiders spend more than thirty-six hours per 
year attending meetings; moreover, many receive little information about 
the meeting prior to their attendance. 264 Although courts might not be able to 
fix the amount of time that a director must devote tp his directorship, they 
could increase the time actually devoted. The courts could insist that the 
duty of care requires that the directors who perform the nominating function 
258 See note 298 and accompanying text infra. , 
259 See Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); 3A W. FLETCHER, 
supra note 43, § 1061; MonEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 35, Comment at 257 (2d ed. 
1977 Supp.); Stern, The General Standard of Care Imposed on Directors Under the 
New California General Corporation Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1269, 1276-77 
(1976). 
26° Corporate Directors' Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1601. 
261 See notes 273-75 and accompanying text infra. 
262 See note 259 and accompanying text supra. 
263 Such a requirement can hardly be deemed radical since directors are already 
required to exercise due care in the selection and r~tention of officers. 3A W. 
FLETCHER, supra note 43, §§ 1079-1080; H. HENN, supra note 45, § 211, at 342; 
Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1607. Query whether there is an 
adequate supply of competent outside directors. See note 169 and accompanying text 
supra. 
264 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 141-43; see note 26 supra. 
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ascertain that nominees will be able to devote an adequate amount of time to 
their positions and recommend that current directors not be renominated if 
they do not devote sufficient time. 
In sum, although a court cannot, under the duty of c~re, require the 
selection of the most independent and competent board possible or the 
commitment of specific amounts of time to directorships, it could impose 
some meaningful demands in these areas. 
C. Corporate Audits and Accounting Procedures 
The most common oversight committee is the audit committee. 265 The 
New York Stock Exchange requires listed companies to have audit commit-
tees composed solely of independent outside directors. 266 Until now au-
dit committees have been intended primarily to prevent misuse of corporate 
funds by management. A principal question is whether they can go beyond 
this beneficial but limited function to the broader task of monitoring corpo-
rate accounting procedures. 
Advocates of the audit committee conceived of it as a device to bring the 
board and the independent auditor together, giving the board an independent 
source of information about misuse of corporate funds and giving the auditor 
an outlet for reports of management's misconduct. Although audit commit-
tees help to deter and discover some questionable payments, their effect is 
probably limited. Accountants concede that an audit often cannot uncover 
skillfully disguised misuse of funds. 267 Even when auditors do discover 
questionable payments, they may be reluctant to report them to the audit 
committee. Management may retaliate and make life difficult for the auditors 
even if it cannot directly fire them. Also, auditors may fear that the board 
will identify with and be more concerned about protecting management than 
supporting the auditors. 268 An auditor might reasonably believe that the 
risks of disclosure exceed the risks of nondisclosure. Furthermore, the 
importance of deterring or discovering and punishing most questionable 
payments is debatable. Some have argued that many questionable payments 
are made in countries where such payments are standard practice and 
therefore American law should not prohibit them; there is some sympathy 
for restricting the scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 269 
265 A survey by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries showed that in 1978, 
963 of 993 responding companies had audit committees. American Society of Corpo-
rate Secretaries, supra note 252, at 1361. 
266 See note 52 supra. In 1977, Connecticut enacted a law in effect requiring every 
domestic corporation with 100 or more shareholders to have an audit committee. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-318(b)(l) (West Supp. 1980). 
267 See DeMott, supra note 58, at 212-13; Harris, supra note 213, at 1239; Sol-
omon, supra note 3, at 609. 
268 Many factors compromise the independence and effectiveness ·of directors. See 
notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra. 
269 [1981] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Jan. 21, 1981) (President Reagan's 
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Cour_ts could_construe th~ duty of care to req~ire a group with a majority 
of outs1ders-e1ther the entrre board or a comm1ttee thereof-to work with 
the firm's independent auditors to prevent misuse of corporate funds. In-
deed, it seems likely that some court will so hold before long, considering that 
the New York Stock Exchange has adopted a rule requiring an independent 
audit committee and that even public companies not listed have widely 
accepted it. However, the possibility of retaliation or board identification 
with management will remain to some extent, and the difficulty of uncover-
ing misuse of funds will also remain. 
If audit committees are to play a significant role in corporate governance 
they must venture beyond the limited task of deterring and discoverin~ 
questionable payments to the broader function of overseeing corporate 
accounting practices. Financial statements are the heart of corporate disclo-
sure, yet ·an intensifying debate questions the adequacy of the generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) used to compile those statements.270 
Under GAAP, companies retain broad discretion in the accounting treat-
ment of many important financial matters. 271 Traditionally, management has 
selected corporate accounting procedures; but GAAP currently allows man-
agement to select procedures with a view to its own interests rather than to 
candid disclosure. For example, managers often seek to maximize short-run 
profits, 272 and toward that end they may try to accelerate the reporting of 
income and defer the reporting of expenses, thereby distorting reports of the 
corporation's financial performance. 
However, an audit committee composed of outside directors would prob-
ably not choose accounting procedures materially different from those se-
lected by management. Most audit committees will face severe constraints 
of time and competence. Accounting is an extremely complex discipline; 273 
monitoring a large public company's accounting practices will require much 
time. The existing difficulty of finding competent directors with a willingness 
to serve274 and sufficient time to do so will become especially acute with 
respect to an audit committee appointed to monitor accounting proce-
dures. 275 Rules of most major accounting firms that bar both current and 
transition team recommends amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to 
remove its criminal penalties); G.A.O. Urges Easing of Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 5, 1981, § D, at 8, col. 5. 
270 See H. KRIPKE, supra note 92, at 144-48; Benston, The Effectiveness and 
Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in EcoNOMIC Poucv 
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 28-29 (H. Manne ed. 1969); 
Speech by SEC Chairman Harold Williams, supra note 67, at 11, 14-15. 
271 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 189-94, and authorities cited therein. 
272 See note 231 supra. 
273 Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1151, 1167-68 (1970). 
274 See note 169 and accompanying text supra. 
275 Membership on an audit committee will require a substantial amount of time. J. 
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retired members from sitting on audit committees exacerbate the short-
age.z76 
Even if the audit committee has the time and competence to monitor 
accounting practices, it will be subject to many of the same pressures which 
influence management. Stock market prices tend to follow short-term per-
formance277 and do not always reflect a sophisticated understanding of 
complex accounting questions. 278 With the board playing an expanded role 
in the corporation, the directors may very well identify their own success 
with the corporation's success and be tempted to stress short-run perfor-
mance in order to inflate the price of the corporation's stock. Moreover, if 
the board selects accounting methods that do not magnify short-term profits, 
it will have to face the unpleasant choice of either removing a management 
team that is performing well or explaining to disgruntled shareholders that 
the corporation's health is rosier than its financials suggest. The audit com-
mittee may well consider emphasis on short-term results preferable to either 
of these alternatives. Failure to choose accounting methods that maximize 
short-term profits and thus stock market price will also invite a tender offer 
by a raider whose understanding of accounting may be more sophisticated 
than the stock market's. The threat of a takeover, which if successful would 
result in the loss of corporate positions for not only management but the 
directors themselves, will pressure the audit committee to stress short-run 
results. 
BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE AUDIT CoMMITTEE 53-54 
(1979). . 
276 Professional standards of the accounting profession prevent an accountant, and 
perhaps even a retired accountant, from serving on the board of a corporation audited 
by his firm or former firm. AICPA Code of Professional Ethics Rule of Conduct 
IOJ(B)(1), 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 101.01; AICPA Interpreta-
tion of Rules of Conduct 101-2, 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) 
§ 101.03. Several of the AICPA's Concepts of Professional Ethics also suggest the 
avoidance of conflict with other members of the profession. AICPA Concepts of 
Professional Ethics, 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) §§ 55.01, .05-.06 
(1979). To avoid such conflicts, an accounting firm might bar incumbent and even 
retired members from serving on audit committees even if the firm is not the 
corporation's auditor. 
211 See note 231 supra. 
278 Commentators have disagreed whether accounting changes that do not affect 
cash flow affect stock price. Some believe that they do. Collins & Dent, The 
Proposed Elimination of Full Cost Accounting in the Extractive Petroleitm Industry: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Market Consequences, I J. AccouNTING & EcoN. 3 
0979); Lev, The Impact of Accounting Regulation on the Stock Market: The 
Case of Oil and Gas Companies, 54 AccouNTING REv. 485 (1979). But see 
Dyckman & Smith, Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing 
Companies: A Study of Information Effects, I J. AccoUNTING & EcoN. 48 
0979); Ball, Changes in Accounting Techniques and Stock Prices, J. AccoUNTING 
RESEARCH I (Supp. I_972, Empirical Research in Accoullting: Selected Studies). 
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From the shareholder's perspective, this may not be undesirable. Al-
though investors generally and the public at large may want accounting 
procedures that most accurately portray corporate performance, existing 
shareholders will often pr.efer financials.that exaggerate profits and thereby 
boost current market pnce. Moreover, the board arguably owes its al-
legiance to the shareholders and thus ought to choose whatever permissible 
accounting method will maximize the market price of the corporation's 
stock. 
In short, delegating the selection of accounting procedures to an audit 
committee of outside directors rather than to management will probably not 
substantially change the methods selected. ·Nor does it seem likely that a rule 
of law can be fashioned that will require an audit committee to select specific 
accounting procedures different from GAAP or from those management 
would choose. Demanding superior accounting procedures will certainly 
become possible as accounting theory develops, but this demand could as 
easily be imposed on management as on an audit committee. Thus," the 
monitoring model is not apt to produce significant improvements in the 
accounting practices of major corporations. 
D. Monitoring Compliance with the Law 
Scandals over illegal corporate activities have led to suggestions that a 
major board function should be monitoring compliance with the law. 279 Both 
the evaluation of management performance and the audit committee dis-
cussed above are intended in part to monitor management's compliance with 
the law, but neither is designed comprehensively to seek out and prevent 
illegality. A legal compliance committee, similar to the audit committee but 
with access to the company's inside and outside counsel, could be useful 
because it would allow counsel to report management transgressions to 
someone other than management. 
Assigning the board a general duty to monitor compliance with the law, 
however, poses several problems. Just as an audit committee may share the 
same attitudes that cause management to make illegal bribes and political 
contributions, 280 so outside directors may share the attitudes that cause 
management to break other laws. If the board sympathizes with manage-
ment, it will not relieve counsel's fear of retaliation for whistleblowing. 
Moreover, counsel is likely to be even more ignorant of corporate illegality 
than auditors are of misuse of funds. 
To require the board continuously to investigate the firm's compliance 
with the law would be unduly costly and impractical for a board dominated 
21 ~ See Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 44, at 1610; The Role and 
Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation: 
Statemem of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2101 (1978). See gener-
ally Coffee, supra note 101. 
280 See note 268 and accompanying text supra. 
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by outsiders. Ifthe board does act as a vigorous watchdog, management will 
view the directors as spies and keep as much information from them as 
possible. 281 Managements often break the law not to line their own pockets 
but to increase profits, 282 and in such cases one might question whether the 
board, as the elected representatives ofthe shareholders, should be assigned 
the task of preventing such breaches. 
Nonetheless, monitoring compliance with the law is a promising board 
function. Although the board may sympathize with efforts to increase profits 
by breaking laws, it will also be anxious to avoid p~rsonalliability for failure 
to perform its duties. The board will therefore have an incentive to monitor 
compliance with the law to the extent that the law requires it to do so. Even 
if management attempts to keep the board ignorant of illegal activities, these 
attempts will not always succeed and incentives can be devised to induce 
management to keep the board well informed. 283 Although shareholders 
might sometimes prefer that laws be broken in order to increase profits, 
public policy need not give any weight to that preference. 
E. Allocating Managerial Duties to Corporate Officers and the Officers' 
Duty to Manage Carefully 
The monitoring model of corporate governance demands a candid recog-
nition that a public corporation can only be and therefore must be managed 
by the corporate executives, not the board of directors. 284 As part of its 
monitoring, however, the board should allocate management chores among 
the corporate officers, or at least ensure that the chief executive officer has 
made such an allocation. Even the advocates of monitoring, who recognize 
the officers as the true managers of the corporation, have ignored the legal 
duties and liabilities of the officers. Courts will find it difficult to fashion 
concrete standards of care for many of the infinitely variable problems that 
corporate officers face, but shifting managerial burdens does clear the way 
for imposing on the officers a more rigorous duty to manage carefully. 285 
Considering the almost complete ineffectiveness of the director's duty to 
manage carefully under the traditional model of corporate governance,286 
this would be a very significant change. 
281 
"[T]o get the outsiders poking around more than they are doing at present ... 
is exactly what [inside managers] don't want." C. STONE, supra note 119, at 143. As 
a result, the board "was always the last group to hear of trouble in great business 
catastrophes of the century." P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPON-
SIBILITIES, PRACTICES 628 (1973). 
282 See Werner, supra note 49, particularly at 388-89. 
283 See Coffee, supra note 101, at 1147-56 (advocating a ''mini-board" structure 
and other devices for improving the flow of information to the board) 0 
284 See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra. 
285 See notes 199-205 and accompanying text supra 0 
286 See notes 131-64 and accompanying text supra 0 
( 
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F. Reviewing Interested Transactions 
Most state corporation laws provide that noninterested members of th 
board may review a transaction in which any corporate officer or director .e 
financially interested. 287 This board review constitutes a long-establishe1~ 
form of monitoring. The growing significance of arguably interested trans-
actions in anti-takeover efforts and board termination of derivative suits h 
increased the importance of the law of interested transactions.2ss To dat~s 
the interested director's in:fluence over the noninterested directors ha~ 
rendered board review ineffective to protect the corporation from unfair 
transactions. The monitoring model increases board independence2B9 and 
thus may improve review of interested transactions, but the improvement 
will probably be slight, especially if inside and affiliated directors remain a 
board majority. 290 Directors will still tend to favor the insiders. The value 
of board review perhaps could be enhanced by increasing the liabilities of 
noninterested directors who approve unfair transactions. However, courts 
are unlikely to impose such liability except in the rare case in which bad faith 
can be shown;291 moreover, the threat of liability could be counterproduc-
tive if the board were made so cautious that it refused to approve even 
beneficial transactions. A standard that required proof of the reviewing 
directors' bad faith would probably lead not to more effective board review 
but to the ritual building of a large, essentially meaningless, paper record 
designed to show the board's diligence and good faith. 292 
More important than the standard of the directors' liability for approving 
interested transactions is the question of the effect of that approval on a 
subsequent shareholders' derivative suit seeking to set aside the transac-
tion or to hold the interested persons liable for damages. State law is 
unclear on this point: some statutes and cases suggest that noninterested 
director approval constitutes a complete defense to such a suit; others 
suggest that it does not prevent a court from deciding whether the transac-
tion was fair to the corporation. 293 If board review became a substantial 
187 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW 
§ 713 (McKinney Supp. 1980); MoDEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 41 (1976). See generally 
W, CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 604-06. 
288 SeeM. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 294 (1978); 
Dent, supra note 138; Leech & Mundheim, supra no.te 20, at 1819-21. 
289 See note 47-48 & 251-52 and accompanying text supra. 
zyo See note 19 and accompanying text supra. 
ZYI See notes 130-41 and accompanying text supra. 
zn Conard, supra note 42, at 903-04. 
293 See statutes cited in note 287 supra. Compare id. with Scott v. Multi-Amp 
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1974) and Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement 
Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 170, 260 P.2d 823, 831-32 (1953) and Remillard Brick Co. 
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952) and 
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (all holding that an interested 
transaction must be reviewed for fairness, even though the statutory language read 
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barrier to shareholders challenging interested transactions, its overall effect 
on corporate law would be pernicious indeed. But if it did not create such 
a barrier, independent director review may be beneficial. The prospect of 
board review, especially if the board is substantially independent, may be a 
better inducement to insiders to design their transactions with the corpora-
tion more fairly than the threat of a derivative suit which may never be 
filed and which, if filed, will face numerous procedural obstacles. 294 
G. The Monitoring Board and Social Goals 
In the 1930's, Professors Berle and Dodd began what has become an 
ongoing debate over the extent to which corporate decisionmakers should 
weigh the social impact of their actions. 295 Some have argued that a 
social conscience can and must be instilled in the corporation by changes 
in corporate governance;296 others contend that the corporation's social 
responsibility is solely to maximize its profits. 297 This Article will not 
attempt to resolve this debate, but it is appropriate to consider the effect of 
monitoring on the corporate social conscience. The monitoring model is apt 
to produce a board committed to financial rather than social goals. By 
tradition, most outside directors are businessmen298 who generally share the 
profit orientation of management. It is hard to imagine that any board 
literally suggested that approval by a majority of disinterested directors or share-
holders is sufficient by itself). See generally H. HENN, supra note 45, § 239, at 375-76; 
N. LATTIN, supra note 131, at 290-94; Israels, The Corporate Triangle-Some 
Aspects of the New Jersey, New York and Delaware Statutes, 23 RuTGERS L. REV. 
615, 627-28 (1969); Note, "Interested Director's " Contracts-Section 713 of the 
New York Business Corporation Lall' and the "Fairness" Test, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV. 
639, 648 (1973) and authorities cited therein; Note, The "Unfair" Interested Direc-
tors' Contract Under the Ne11' York Business Corporation Lcn1', 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 
840, 841-43 (1967) and authorities cited therein. 
2 ~ 4 See note 164 supra. 
295 The debate began with Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932), and the response in Eerie, For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). For a continuation of 
the debate see Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. 
REv. 1 (i979); Weiner, The Eerie-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964 ). 
2
% See R. NADER, supra note 3; Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in 
CORPORATE PoWER IN AMERICA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973). 
297 Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, reprinted in M. FRIEDMAN, AN 
EcoNOMIST's PROTEST 177-84 (1972). Professor Kripke has recently discussed the 
dangers of a board dominated by outsiders and committed to social rather than 
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would deliberately depart from this tradition or that new directors not 
sharing the profit orientation would be nominated in large numbers by 
accident. Moreover, even if a board wanted substantially to abandon profit 
maximization, it probably could not do so for long because such action 
would attract takeover bids, proxy fights, and derivative suits for corporate 
waste. 299 If successful, any of the above would quickly reorient the corpo-
ration toward profit maximization. 
H. Other Monitoring Functions 
Other monitoring functions will probably not be as important as those 
previously discussed. The board will continue to be an occasional source 
of advice and counsel to management, but this will remain an insignificant 
function. 300 The board will still be required by state corporation laws to 
approve certain transactions, such as mergers and declarations of divi-
dends.301 Perhaps the more independent board envisioned by the monitoring 
model will play a more active role in such situations than the traditional 
board has, but for the most part the board will continue to rubber stamp 
management's proposals. Indeed, this is consistent with the philosophy that 
the board's function is to monitor, not to manage. 
VII. CODA 
A. The Duty of Care vs. Other Possible Ei1forcement Mechanisms: A 
Recapitulation 
This Article earlier concluded that the duty of care could be at least as 
effective a tool for enforcing the monitoring model as any new or existing 
legislation. 3° 2 In light of the subsequent conclusion that the duty of care is a 
deeply flawed tool for this purpose, it is appropriate briefly to reconsider the 
earlier conclusion. New legislation could overcome some problems noted 
with respect to the duty of care. For example, new legislation could require a 
majority of outside directors and even define the. size of the required ma-
jority. However, most problems, especially the problem of providing sub-
MITTEES OF THE BOARD 29, 39 (1973): M. MACE, supra note 13, at 87, 96-97, 
106; Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 
217 (1971); Soderquist, supra note 146, at 1350-51; Solomon, supra note 3, at 584 & 
n.13. 
<~~ A!~pq\lgh none of these devices is completely effective, see notes 71-81 & 164 
and accompanying text supra; see generally notes 130-64 and accompanying text 
supra, they do in ·many cases constitute a substantial constraint on the ability of the 
~oard to abandon the goal of profit maximization. See Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, J. PoL. EcoN. 73 (1965); note 163 sujJra. 
3°0 M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 157-58. 
3° 1 See note 145 supra. 
3°2 See text accompanying notes 123-24 and text preceding note 165 supra. 
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stantive standards for the board's duty to evaluate management's perfor-
mance, are inherent in monitoring and are thus not subject to legislative 
solution. In light of the tremendous political obstacles to new legislation, 
efforts to require adoption of the monitoring model and to enforce duties 
thereunder will be better focused on the duty of care despite its shortcom-
ings. It follows a fortiori that existing legislation, none of which was de-
signed to enforce the monitoring model, is also less promising than the duty 
of care. 
B. Conclusion 
The common law duty of care can, with minor exceptions, accomplish as 
much as new or existing legislation toward mandating and enforcing the 
monitoring model of corporate governance and is preferable thereto be-
cause of the political improbability of enacting effective legislation. Most of 
the considerations that have led the courts to eviscerate the duty of care 
disappear under the monitoring model. The time is propitious for persuad-
ing the courts to reinvigorate the duty of care-the American Law Institute 
(ALI) has undertaken a project on corporate governance303 and, if it 
adopts an approach to the duty of care similar to that proposed in this 
Article, the prestige of the ALI will induce many courts to follow suit just as 
they have in the past followed the ALI's Restatements of the Law. 
A far greater problem than convincing the courts to breathe life into the 
duty of care will be articulating specific, enforceable substantive standards 
for the discrete functions to be performed by the board under the monitor-
ing model. Although the courts can impose effective substantive standards 
in some cases and at least require boards to follow certain procedures in 
others, they will usually find it impossible to articulate substantive stan-
dards. Thus, the monitoring model will be a largely unenforceable ideal, 
and will probably be so even if legislation is enacted to enforce it. 
This does not mean that the monitoring model is useless. The combined 
weight of the law's moral force, of court-imposed procedural requirements, 
and of outside directors' good faith will lead to some effective monitoring. 
Certainly, the impact on corporate governance should be more beneficial 
than abolition of the board of directors, the only alternative if one rejects 
monitoring: if the board cannot monitor, there is no useful function it can 
P~rform. But there should be no unrealistic expectations about the mag-
mtude of the benefit. Long traditions of directorial passivity must be 
overcome if boards are to monitor effectively, and neither market forces 
nor the law are adequate to the purpose. 
303 s R ee Kaplan Named Chief Reporter for Corporate Governance Project, 2 ALI 
EPORTER 1 (April, 1980). 
